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ABSTRACT

In this paper, I investigate one stated purpose of deregulation in the electric utility
industry - to make utility operations more responsive to news releases, a proxy for
market forces. My premise is that utilities providing electricity to highly deregulated
states will be more responsive to market forces than those providing electricity to non
deregulated states.

I employ intraday data from April to June 2001, the year after

deregulation, and from 1994, the year before deregulation. I also employ the BrownForsythe-Modified Levene (BFL) test to determine the volatility differences between
days with released news and days without released news. The results of BFL F tests for
the year 2001 indicate that utilities headquartered in and serving states that have
undergone substantial deregulation respond to news releases more strongly than those
utilities headquartered in and serving states that are still regulated. The BFL F tests for
utilities in 1994 confirm the premise that regulated utilities are less responsive to news
releases. Finally, I conduct regression tests for utilities, the results of which support the
findings from BFL tests - that all utilities serving highly deregulated states show
pronounced responses to macroeconomic news releases. It appears that deregulation in
the electric utility industry does, in fact, make utility operations more responsive to
market forces and that deregulation is effective for states that implement a customerchoice model.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents an empirical study of the effectiveness of deregulation in the
electric utility industry, based on utilities' responses to two types of information:
idiosyncratic news and macroeconomic news. The choice of this topic is motivated by a
comparative examination of each state's restructuring plan relative to California's energy
crisis and rolling blackout during the winter of 2000-2001, and Pennsylvania's successful
deregulation plan that lowers retail rates, produces a reliable power supply, and improves
services and choices of cleaner energy products. The deregulation of the electric utility
industry is designed to reduce government intervention, to let the interaction of the
supply and demand determine wholesale power price, and to encourage competition in
retail markets so that customers may choose their power suppliers based on options of
low rates or high-quality services. However, the success of deregulation depends mostly
on each individual state's restructuring plans because these states' restructuring plans
directly affect shareholders, managers, customers, and regulators. With open competition
in the electric utility industry, money lost by imprudent investments can no longer be
recovered. To serve stockholders more efficiently, then, management must seek cost
control, on one hand, and, on the other hand, innovative ways to provide customers lower
rates as well as multiple choices of services. Because stock prices respond quickly and

1
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sharply and sometimes ruthlessly to any related news, shareholders face greater risks with
uncertain cash flow caused by open competition.
The contribution of the study is listed as follows: (1) the success of deregulation
depends largely on each state’s restructuring plan; therefore, this study provides state and
federal legislatures with empirical evidence of the effectiveness of deregulation; (2) the
finding of the study will influence the way state and federal legislatures enact utility laws;
(3) this study provides empirical evidence of successful deregulation models; therefore, a
further study of the restructuring policies of successful deregulation models could be
done to improve the competition of the electric utility industry in all states; (4) this study
provides methods that may be applied to other deregulated industries. To measure the
success of the deregulation process of each state, I examine utilities’ responses to market
forces, comparing utilities providing electricity to highly deregulated states with those
providing electricity to regulated states in 2001. In order to develop a more accurate and
robust base of reference, I also examine the responses of the specified utilities to market
forces for the year 1994 (the year preceding deregulation).

My study shows that

deregulation in the electric utility industry does, in fact, make utility operations more
responsive to market forces and that deregulation is indeed effective for states that
implement a customer-choice model. Both BFL F tests and regression tests provide
substantial empirical evidence that utilities respond more vigorously to market forces in a
deregulated environment and that deregulation is indeed effective in states that
implement a customer-choice model.
On December 4, 2000, newspapers carried the astonishing news that California
was experiencing a severe energy crisis. In fact, the state issued a Stage Two emergency,
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which meant that the electrical power reserve had fallen below 5 percent or was expected
to fall to that critical level within two hours. At that point, suppliers were allowed to cut
power to customers who had signed up for a voluntary emergency interruption program
(VIP) in exchange for a 15-20 percent rate reduction.

In the days and weeks that

followed, California’s power crisis continued to worsen.

On December 7, an

unprecedented Stage Three emergency was declared for approximately two hours,
beginning at 5:15 p.m. A Stage Three emergency is called when the power reserve falls
below 1.5 percent, a level that may trigger a “rolling” blackout, which shuts off a large
area for a period of time, usually an hour, to relieve the burden to the transmission grid.
Indeed, the California energy crisis grew even worse after powerful storms hit the state
January 9 to 11, 2001. On the night of January 11, 2001, the California Independent
System Operator (Cal-ISO), a non-profit corporation, declared a Stage Three emergency
for only the second time in the state’s history, and blackouts were narrowly averted when
the federally owned Bonneville Power Administration in the Pacific Northwest sent 1,000
megawatts to parts of California. Still the crisis continued to deepen.

On January 16,

2001, electrical power to some businesses was shut off during so-called voluntary
interruptible periods, and rolling blackouts began on January 17, 2001, at 11:30 a.m.,
when Cal-ISO ordered the utilities in Northern California to reduce their load by 500
megawatts. By California law, it is the utilities’ responsibility to provide outage plans, to
be approved by the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC).

The power loss

caused chaos in California. For more than thirty days during the winter of 2001, the state
remained in a Stage Three emergency, and throughout the spring and summer of 2001
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continued to urge conservation o f electric power and to declare Stages One and Two
emergencies as demand increased.1
In April 1994, the California PUC proposed a radical restructuring plan called the
“blue book” and issued an initial order for “direct access” for retail customers, which
would allow customers to choose their electricity suppliers.

The law, enacted in

September 1996, set up a statewide plan for the transition from the traditional
monopolistic electric industry to a competitive one. Low-cost private generators were
able to enter the market because the large power monopolies were required to divest their
generation plants and to purchase power through a power clearinghouse called Power
Exchange, which, in turn, determined power prices according to supply and demand in
the spot market. Customers received an immediate 10 percent rate reduction, financed by
bonds to be repaid by customer fees over a ten-year period. To stabilize electric rates* the
law froze rates at the 1996 level to be extended until the year 2002 or until utilities
recovered their stranded cost. And to help utilities recover their stranded cost more
quickly, customers were charged another fee called the Competition Transition Charge to
be extended until the year 2002.

The final order for implementing free-market

competition for all consumers in California was issued in April 1998. As of year 2002,
the transmission segment of the electric utility industry in California is still regulated, and

1News reports are compiled from daily news provided by the on-line resource of CNN. The site
http://www.cnn.com/SPEClALS/2001 /power.crisis/stories.html provides links to important daily news
related to the California crisis from Dec. 6 to March 19,2001. To compile this section I also used
material from “The California Crisis - California Timeline”, a source that provides news for major
events related to deregulation in California form 1995 to May 2001, and available for download at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/blackout/califomia/timeline.html
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the state’s investor-owned utilities have been ordered to turn over their transmission lines
to the Cal-ISO, thereby assuring the reliability of transmissions.2
The deregulation of the electric utility industry has not been successful in
California.

Escalating energy costs have driven up the wholesale prices, and when

demand has been high, power suppliers have been allowed to charge any price they want.
Moreover, high profits by active generators have reduced the incentive for building new
generation plants. Yet because of price caps, utilities are not allowed to pass on to
customers the increasing cost of energy. In fact, two of the state’s largest utilities were
forced into bankruptcy. Further exacerbating the crisis, utilities in other states have been
unwilling to supply power to California because of their fear of not being paid.
Moreover, shareholders’ investments have fallen sharply because of falling credit ratings
and the financial instability of the utilities. In an effort to prop up the electric power
investments, the California Public Utility Commission approved a rate increase of 40
percent, effective May 2001, for customers of the two largest investor-owned utilities.
The government also allowed utilities to sign long-term contracts with suppliers to reduce
their risk in the wholesale market, but with the financial crisis the utilities face, suppliers
hesitate to offer the long-term contracts. Although deregulation was designed to increase
the competition in generation and distribution segments, the outcome in California failed.
In fact, the California Public Utility Commission was forced to suspend retail access in

1 This section is compiled from “Status o f State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as o f September
2002”, and is available for download at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf7electricity/chg_str/califomia.html
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October 20013 and to submit a new plan—the ISO’s Market Design 2002 proposal—to
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.4
In contrast to California’s failed attempt at deregulation, Pennsylvania established
a successful model for deregulation in the electric utility industry.

The Electricity

Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act, HB 1509, was passed in December
1996.5 Under that law, utilities were not required to divest their generation plants but to
submit their own locally adapted restructuring plans by September 1997. For example,
the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission approved PECO Energy Company's
restructuring plan in May 1998:
Under this plan, PECO customers will receive an 8 percent rate reduction
next year, 6 percent in 2000, with 20 percent savings expected for those
willing to shop for power. PECO will be allowed to recover $5.26 billion
in stranded costs over a period of 12 years. Two-thirds of customers will
be phased in to retail competition by January 1999 and all customers by
January 2000.6

The success of Pennsylvania’s deregulation plan may be inferred from the
following comments by John Hanger, former Pennsylvania Commissioner and currently
CEO and President of PennFuture:
In 1996, Pennsylvania’s electricity rates were about 10-15% above the
national average. Today they are 4% below the national average.
Pennsylvania’s consumers have saved $2.84 billion since passage of its
electricity competition statute in December 1996. 80,000 customers are
buying cleaner or renewable energy products who never got these products
from monopolies. . . . No customer is paying more than what they were
paying on Jan. 1, 1997.. . . 8,000 megawatts of new plant construction
3 See the “Status o f State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as o f September 2002,” pp.6. Available
for download at www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/califomia.html
4 See the “Status o f State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as o f September 2002,” pp.l. Available
for download at www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/caJifomia.html
5 See the “Status o f State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as of September 2002,” pp.2. Available
for download at www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/pennsylvania.html
6 See the “Status o f State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as o f September 2002,” pp.3. Available
for download at www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg^str/pennsyIvania.html
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will come on line in 2001 and 2 0 0 2 .... More than 50% of all customers
who have switched in the country have switched in Pennsylvania
7

Nationally there is no time frame for restructuring electric utilities; each state sets
its own schedule. As expected, some states have moved quickly, whereas others have
been more cautious. For instance, the report provided by the Louisiana Public Service
Commission (PSC) in May 1999 recommended that no action be taken toward retail
competition because o f the lower-than-average electric rates and the relatively few
generators in the state. However, the Louisiana PSC did issue a draft of a restructuring
plan, effective January 2003, that would allow large industrial customers to choose their
suppliers. But Louisiana has not yet called for utilities to divest their generation plants.
The Louisiana PSC has requested another study to be due in 2005 to determine whether
direct access will benefit all customers.8
For almost a century, the electric utility industry has been regulated by the
government, at state and federal levels. The evolvement of the electric utility industry
and the development o f authority held by both state and federal governments over the
industry are quite interesting. The opening of Thomas Edison's generating station on
September 4,1882, in New York City initiated the modem electric power industry.9 The
New York City gas and electric carbon-arc commercial and street lighting system served
fifty-nine customers in a one-square-mile radius. By the end o f the 1880s, many cities
had small stations serving a small area. Then in 1896, using the hydraulic power from
7 See the Retail Energy Deregulation (RED) Index, 2nd edition, July 2001, from the Center for the
Advancement o f Energy Markets, pp. 33.
8 This section is compiled from “Status of State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as o f September
2002”, and is available for download at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/chg str/louisiana.html
9 See the “The Changing Structure o f the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information
Administration, Office o f Coal Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department o f Energy,
September 1996, pp. 105-115. Available for download at
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/page/electric kid/append a.html
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Niagara Falls with a multiple-phase generator designed by Nikola Tesla, George
Westinghouse built the Niagara power station to transmit a massive amount of power to
Buffalo, New York, over twenty miles away.10 Soon, private utilities sprang up rapidly,
and competition was strong. The next big change came early in the twentieth century,
when private electric utilities merged into large utility holding companies to offer more
economical rates in large-scale operations by serving large cities and by reducing risks
with diversification o f investments in a variety of geographical areas.11 "By 1930, 90
percent of all operating utilities were controlled by nineteen utility holding companies."12
The uncontrolled expansion of service areas by these utility holding companies
prompted state regulations in the early 1900s. "Georgia, New York, and Wisconsin
established State public service commissions in 1907, followed quickly by more than 20
other States.

Basic State powers included the authority to franchise the utilities to

regulate their rates, financing, and service, and to establish utility accounting systems."13
However, the state regulations had no power over interstate commerce, a fact that
resulted in abuses by utility holding companies. A "pyramiding process" allowed these
holding companies to increase their control over the bottom level of the operating
utilities. First, the holding companies often issued bond and preferred stock to finance

10 See the “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information
Administration, Office o f Coal Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department o f Energy,
September 1996, pp. 105-1 IS. Available for download at
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/Dage/electric kid/append a.html
" See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act o f 1935:1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration,
U.S. Department o f Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.3. Principal author o f the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent,
Administrator o f the Energy Information Administration.
12 See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act o f 1935:1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration,
U.S. Department o f Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.6. Principal author of the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent,
Administrator o f the Energy Information Administration.
13 See the “The Changing Structure o f the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information
Administration, Office o f Coal Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department of Energy,
September 1996, pp. 105-115. Available for download at
www.eia.doe.gov/cneafyelectricitv/page/electric kid/append a.html
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the acquisition of the operating utilities, which in turn caused many operating utilities to
fail. Second, the holding companies charged "exorbitant service fees to their subsidiary
companies" and "these excessive fees (e.g., construction charges) were then capitalized
into the accounts o f the holding company, which in turn inflated the operating utility's
book value and caused the rates charged to the customers to increase."14 Last, because of
the excess benefits generated by the pyramid structure of holding companies, the sale of
the operating utilities to other holding companies inflated prices well above their market
value. As a result, the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) was passed in
1935. Under this bill, all utility holding companies were required to register with the
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and to come under the supervision of the
SEC.

This bill also required each utility holding company that operated interstate

commerce to be integrated into an efficient system, preferably confined to a single state
so that it could be regulated by that state's public service commission.

By the end of

1950, all utility holding companies were integrated or simplified into smaller
organizations.15
The growing demand for electricity from 1945 through 1970 was met by a
combination of the expansion o f privately owned utilities and federally owned power
plants, development of commercial nuclear power plants, and, most significantly,
improved technology that provided greater efficiency and reliability in generation and
transmission.

14See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act o f 1935:1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration,
U.S. Department o f Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.5. Principal author o f the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent,
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration.
15See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act o f 1935: 1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration,
U.S. Department o f Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.12. Principal author o f the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent,
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration.
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These productivity gains had a more substantive effect on customers, who
watched the price of electricity decline. Adjusted to 1992 terms, a
residential customer in 1892 paid more than 4 dollars for each kilowatthour, . . . But by 1907, the price had dropped by more than half, to $1.56
per kWh. As utilities pursued incremental technological advances, prices
fell to 55 cents in 1927 and 19 cents in 1947. . . . the price of electricity
dropped to 13 cents per kWh in 19[5]3 and 9 cents in 1967.16

For almost a century now - since the beginning of electric power regulation every electric utility system has been regulated by both federal and state governments
when it operates three functional segments - generation, transmission, and distribution as a monopolistic market. But a 1944 Supreme Court ruling allowed Hope Natural Gas
(Federal Power Commission vs. Hope Natural Gas Company) to cover the original or
replacement cost, plus a reasonable rate of return;17 thereby a regulation policy was
established which gave customers the lowest rates possible as well as allowing utilities a
reasonable rate o f return.
During the 1970s, the electric utility power industry faced major challenges.
Increasing oil prices, caused by the oil embargo and energy crisis in 1972, drove the
power cost up. Then capital costs increased because of growing inflation, and, finally, the
demand for nuclear power plummeted because of environmental concerns prompted by
the incident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.18 To
meet these challenges, several steps were taken.

In order to reduce dependency on

16 See the “Post World War II "Golden Years," Available for download at
http://americanhistory.si.edu/csr/powering/hirsh2/fnnain.htm
17 See the “The Changing Structure o f the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information
Administration, Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department of Energy,
September 1996, pp. 105-115. Available for download at
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/Dage/electric kid/append a.html
18See the “The Changing Structure o f the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information
Administration, Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department o f Energy,
September 1996, pp. 105-115. Available for download at
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/page/electric kid/append a.html
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foreign oil, to promote alternative energy sources, and to increase competition among
generation plants, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPC) of
1978 that would encourage a new class of producers, called Independent Power
Producers (IPPs) or Qualifying Facilities (QFs), to join the commercial power production
market. These unregulated IPPs generated power for their own use, plus a surplus to sell,
or they co-generated a usable energy as a byproduct of generation. For instance, the
paper industry often produces wood waste as a byproduct of the manufacturing process,
which, in turn, can become a so-called renewable fuel to generate electricity.19 With the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s approval, IPPs were allowed to sell their
energy to utilities at the marginal cost (avoided cost) that utilities would have incurred in
producing that power.20 These avoided costs were usually set up in favor of producers to
encourage more unregulated producers to enter the wholesale market.

With this

favorable support, EPPs produced about 9 percent of all electricity in the U. S. during
1991.21
A long debate over the PUHCA reform movement began in the 1980s.22 Those
who advocated reform emphasized that the Act put limits on diversification that, in
effect, weakened the holding companies' competition and growth. Further, the advocates
maintain, the Law also prevented IPPs from purchasing operating utilities because that

19 See the “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information
Administration, Office o f Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department o f Energy,
September 1996,105-1 IS. Available for download at
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/page/electric kid/append a.html
20 See the report from the Value Line Investment Survey dated February 24,1995, Vol. 50, Pt. 4, pp. 1732
21 See the “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information
Administration, Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department o f Energy,
September 1996, pp. 105-115. Available for download at
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/page/electric kid/append a.html
22 Detailed debate over the PUHCA reform can be found in the article o f “Public Utility Holding Company
Act o f 1935: 1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration, Office o f the Administrator, U.S.
Department o f Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.23-27.
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would put them under the regulation of the PUHCA; thus, IPPs would be forced to divest
all businesses unrelated to utilities.23 Those who opposed the reform of the PUHCA
contended that repealing o f the Act would promote monopoly control in the industry and
the diversification would only increase difficulties for governments in monitoring the
businesses.

Moreover, the diversification would also increase the risk, not only to

shareholders but also to ratepayers. Two Public Laws, 99-186 and 99-648, passed in
1985 and 1986 respectively, provided limited diversification for utilities, IPPs, or any
other nonutilities. Public Law 99-186 allowed utility holding companies to purchase
coal-generation facilities in any geographical area; whereas Public Law 99-648 allowed
nonutility holding companies to own one gas utility subsidiary.24 With the increasing
number of mergers and acquisitions, most o f the utility holding companies operated two
types of businesses: regulated and unregulated.
The process of the PUHCA reform was accelerated when President Bush issued
an order on July 26, 1989, directing the Department of Energy to develop a
comprehensive National Energy Strategy.

The main focus of the National Energy

Strategy was to allow generators to freely compete in wholesale markets across the
United States.25 After a long debate in the House, the PUHCA reform was passed by
Congress in 1992 as the Energy Policy Act. This Act is the most comprehensive piece of
legislation in energy history and impacts all producers, utilities, and customers

23 See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act o f 1935:1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration,
U.S. Department o f Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.25. Principal author of the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent,
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration.
24 See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act o f 1935:1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration,
U.S. Department o f Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.29. Principal author o f the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent,
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration.
25 See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act o f 1935:1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration,
U.S. Department o f Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.57. Principal author of the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent,
Administrator o f the Energy Information Administration.
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nationwide as well as federal and state governments. Producers are allowed to petition
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for access to transmission grids owned by
private utilities, and utilities that provide the services are allowed to charge fees to
recover their cost. In this Act, a new class of generators, Exempt Wholesale Generators
(EWGs), is defined as "any person determined by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to be engaged directly . . . at wholesale [market exclusively]."26
These EWGs are not subject to regulation under the PUHCA, but serve to increase the
competition in the wholesale market and to expedite the deregulation of the generation
segment of the electric utility industry.
In July 1996, Congressman Dan Schaefer introduced a bill to further deregulate
the distribution segment in the electric utility industry. Under his proposal, each state
was required to submit a restructuring plan allowing customers to choose their power
suppliers by December 15, 2000.27 While the FERC set guidelines for wholesale market
rules and transmission accessibility, Schaefer's bill gave states freedom to implement
retail access.28
Since deregulation legislation, many states, like California, Rhode Island,
Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and New York, have responded quickly and have either
proposed or implemented restructuring plans for the transition in the electric utility
industry from a monopolistic model to a customer-choice model.

Because o f the

independence of the restructuring plans implemented in each state, the progress o f the
deregulation in the retail market in each state is also different. As of September 2002, the
District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
26 See the Energy Policy Act, Section 711 of subtitle A for details.
27 See the report from the Value Line Investment Survey dated August 23,1996, Vol. 51, Pt. 7, pp. 1729
28 See the report from the Value Line Investment Survey dated October 11,1996, Vol. 52, Pt. 1, pp. 701
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Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas have opened full retail access to all
customers. Some states opened retail access only to commercial and industrial customers
- Nevada and Oregon. One state - Oklahoma - has delayed implementation indefinitely.
California has suspended retail access, and Louisiana is still studying options for partial
deregulation.29
At the beginning of the twentieth century, policy makers believed that the vertical
integrated structure of the electric utility industry provided large-scale economies;
thereby offering customers lower electric rates.

Later in the century, electric utilities

were further protected, guaranteed a cost recovery under the cost-of-service regulation.
Because of imprudent investments and increased power costs during the 1970s, electric
rates spiked, and pressure by customers to lower electric rates brought about the need for
deregulation. The history o f the electric utility industry reveals the interesting fact that
both regulation and deregulation were requested by the same groups, customers and
electric utilities; therefore, it is very important to know whether the implementation of
governmental policies serves the purpose that policy makers intend. My conjecture is
that with regulation as a protection cap for the utility industry, market becomes less
efficient and more sluggish to the response of news releases. Furthermore, in a highly
deregulated market, information will be incorporated in prices rapidly and response to
new information will be strong. Because the success o f deregulation in the electric utility
industry depends on the response of utilities to market forces, I test the effectiveness of
deregulation in the utility industry, using the utilities' responses to macroeconomic news,
the best measures o f market forces, and the idiosyncratic news. Ross (1989) maintains

29 See the “Status o f State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity, Timeline as o f September 2002,”
Available for download at www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/chg str/retail access timeline.html
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that the arrival of information has a direct impact on the volatility of stock prices in an
arbitrage-free environment.

So in order to observe stock return responses to news

releases, I employ second-by-second intraday stock returns to test the volatility
differences between days with news releases and days without news releases. Thus, the
value o f this study is twofold: to provide methods for testing the effectiveness of
deregulation that may be applied to any deregulated industry and to provide empirical
evidence of the effectiveness o f various states’ restructuring plans. Further study of the
implementation of the successful models will help policy makers expedite restructuring
plans in the electric utility industry in all states.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are three prevailing theories o f economic regulation: Public Interest theory,
Capture theory, and Buffering theory. The Public Interest theory holds that traditional
regulation corrects market failures on behalf of consumers. The Capture theory contends
that regulation is captured by regulated industries to protect their interests at the expense
of consumers. The Buffering theory refers to a wealth redistribution among participatory
groups in which a successful regulator adjusts regulated prices to benefit both producers
and consumers.
Not many empirical studies support the Public Interest theory, because their
findings show that regulation has only minor and slow effects in lowering prices and in
alleviating price discrimination for consumers.

Similarly, few empirical studies give

support to the Capture theory, which maintains that industrial groups profit from charging
higher prices and exercising price discrimination. Contrary to the weak support for the
Public Interest theory and the Capture theory, many studies support the Buffering theory
by providing evidence that regulation reduces firm-specific risks as well as systematic
risk, thereby increasing shareholders’ wealth, and, at the same time, offering lower prices
to consumers. However, in a deregulated environment, firms are no longer “buffered” by
regulation, but, in fact, are more sensitive to economic forces and idiosyncratic news.

16
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A number of empirical studies examine the following concerns: (1) factors that
affect security price adjustment, (2) the speed of price adjustment to idiosyncratic news
and macroeconomic news, measures of economic forces, and (3) volatility persistence.
However, no articles examine the differences among responses to macroeconomic news
and idiosyncratic news before and after deregulation. Furthermore, no articles probe the
effectiveness of deregulation by comparing responses to macroeconomic news and
idiosyncratic news between highly deregulated firms and regulated firms in any industry.
According to the Buffering theory, the responses to economic forces and idiosyncratic
news are stronger and the volatility persistence is weaker in a deregulated environment
than in a regulated environment. It follows, therefore, that the responses to economic
forces and idiosyncratic news are stronger and the volatility persistence is weaker in a
highly deregulated environment.

2.1: An Overview of Theories of Economic Regulation
“Economic regulation” refers broadly to any government intervention, at either
state or federal level, in the economic sphere (Posner 1974); but within this broad
category of economic control, there are more narrowly defined areas to be analyzed: the
forms of government intervention, the beneficiaries of regulation, and the effectiveness of
regulation (Stigler 1971).

There are basically three prevailing theories of economic

regulation: Public Interest theory, Capture theory, and Buffering theory.
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2.1.1; Public Interest Theory (Consumer Protection Theory)
The development of the Public Interest theory is based on two assumptions: (1)
that the economic market is inefficient and inequitable without regulation; and (2) that
government regulation is costless (Posner 1974). The Public Interest theory advocates
traditional regulation, according to its proponents, and serves to correct market failure on
behalf o f consumers. One example of market failure occurs when goods or services
needed by a majority of customers in a specific area are controlled by a single company.
That company, having monopolistic power, can then exploit customers by charging
exorbitant prices or by refusing to provide goods or services to unprofitable areas.
Therefore, according to the Public theory, the demand for regulation serves to protect
customers from exploitation or abandonment by monopolistic companies.

Another

example o f market failure is an externality, which occurs when an industry impacts others
either negatively or positively and is not penalized or compensated. The use of taxes for
industries with negative externality, the use of subsidies for industries with positive
externality, and the use of property rights to promote technological inventions are
examples of regulation for the benefit of the pubic interest.

2.1.2: Capture Theory (Producer Protection Theory)
In contrast to regulation for protecting consumers' interest, the Capture theory
requires that regulated industries or producers seek regulation to protect their own
interests. This theory assumes that producers have influence on the structure and process
o f regulation; thus, regulation is “captured” by producers to gain benefits from regulation.
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Stigler (1971) proposes a refined version o f the Capture theory. He maintains that
regulation is the product o f political decision-making, which is different from market
decision-making. Market decision-making occurs frequently and involves only those
who are directly affected, whereas political decision-making involves all voters,
interested or uninterested. The price of the political decision-making includes costs of
lobbying, contributions to political parties, and costs of disseminating information to
individuals who have little or no concern with the issues. Thus, "producer protection,” as
this process is called, benefits a small group of industries holding large financial
resources, because only the smaller, more concentrated industries with a large per capita
stake have enough resources to invest in campaigns for legislation (Peltzman 1976).
Therefore, Stigler argues, the demand for regulation does not correct market failure for
customers' sake, but does, in fact, serve to transfer wealth from a large number of
diffused group (customers) to a compact and more influential group, i.e., participatory
industrial group, through regulatory processes in the form of cash subsidies, price control,
and entry restriction.

2.1.3: Buffering Theory (Political Support Theory)
Instead of protecting only one compact industrial unit, the so-called Buffering
theory refers to regulation support from a combination of industry and consumers, “[t]he
former obtaining some monopoly profits from regulation, the latter obtaining lower prices
(or better service) than they would in an unregulated market—all at the expense of
unorganized, mostly consumer, groups” (Posner 1974). This Buffering theory, developed
by Peltzman (1976), adapts Stigler’s Capture theory in a formal model to demonstrate
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Peltzman’s own theory that economic regulation is not merely a wealth transfer from
customers to a producer group, as suggested by Stigler, but a wealth redistribution
through a political process among interested groups.30 There are three interpretations of
Peltzman’s model: (1) that total wealth is distributed among interested groups: producers
and customers; (2) that regulation reduces firm-specific risk, and possibly systematic risk
as well; and (3) that the price discrimination problems existing in monopolistic and
competitive markets are attenuated through “cross-subsidization.”
In response to changes in demand and costs, Peltzman shows in his model how a
successful “buffering” regulator adjusts the regulated prices to benefit both producers and
customers. Thus, the total wealth that a regulator can distribute changes when economic
factors change. For example, a change in marginal costs, in productivity, or in demand
affects the total profit that the regulator can distribute. Because of this, a “buffering”
regulator makes appropriate adjustments so that customers absorb some of producers’
losses and, in return, producers share gains with their customers.

For example, an

increase in the marginal cost o f production reduces the total profit, which, in turn,
prompts the regulator to increase the price charged to customers, thereby buffering
producers’ losses. On the other hand, an increased demand in production prompts the
regulator to reduce prices. Thus, the higher profits generated by increased demand will
be shared by customers.
Moreover, the structure of regulated prices provides a cushion, or buffer, for
producers against the impact of sudden changes in demand and costs, thereby reducing

30 See Sam Peltzman, ‘Toward a More General Theory o f Regulation,” The Journal o f Law and
Economics, April 1976, pp. 211-240 for the details o f the mathematical model.
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the volatility o f stock prices and the risk of the regulated firms. If the changes are
economy-wide, regulation should even reduce systematic risk.
Furthermore, a “buffering” regulator will suppress some economic forces in order
to attenuate the problem o f price discrimination among customers. One example of an
economic force that a regulator may suppress is cost disparity; high-cost customers are
subsidized by the low-cost customers. This phenomenon appears in many industries;
e.g., utility customers in rural areas subsidized by those in urban areas and airline
services in unprofitable small cities subsidized by large cities. Consequently, regulated
firms are less sensitive to economic forces than unregulated firms.

2.2; Empirical Study Relating to Regulated Theories
2.2.1: Public Interest Theory
If regulation does, in fact, protect consumers, one should find a consistency of
increased wealth of consumers directly related to the implementation of regulations in
different industries, such as drug, electricity, water, natural gas, airline, cable, and
transportation. However, empirical studies do not support this Public Interest theory. For
instance, the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
were designed to give the Food and Drug Administration authority to regulate new drugs
for safety and effectiveness before they enter the market (Peltzman 1973). But in a costbenefit analysis for 1970, Peltzman found that the cost o f implementing the amendment
far exceeded the benefit. Peltzman maintains that “[t]he net effect of the amendments on
consumers is comparable to their being taxed something between 5 and 10 percent on
their $5 billion annual drug purchases.”
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Moreover, findings from various studies show little effect of regulation on
monopolistic industries like electricity and natural gas, both of which are considered
natural monopolies because of their extensive economic power. Therefore, regulation is
designed to diminish its economic power for customers’ benefit in terms of price,
availability, and service quality (Jordan 1972).31 However, empirical studies suggest that
regulation has little effect on price and price discrimination. Electric utilities are a good
example. Stigler and Friedland (1962) conclude that “[t]he regulation of electric utilities
by state commissions from 1907 through 1937 had no measurable impact on the level of
electric utility rates, on the charging of discriminatory prices, and on the market values of
utility stocks.” Likewise, studies o f electric utility rates on commercial, industrial, and
residential customers by Jackson (1969) and Moore (1970) indicate that regulation has
little effect on electric utility rates. Although the earliest state regulations started in 1907
in Georgia, New York, and Wisconsin to lower electric utility rates, commercial and
industrial consumers began to benefit from lower electric utility rates during the years of
1940-1950. The least powerful group, residential customers, who were supposed to
benefit the most, had waited until 1960 to realize lower rates (Jackson 1969).
Although regulation o f monopolistic industries was intended to lower prices and
reduce price discrimination for public consumption while limiting producers’ economic
power, all research findings show minor and slow effects of regulation in lowering prices
and reducing price discrimination. Posner (1972, 1974) suggests two reasons to explain
the minor and slow effects o f regulation in lowering prices and reducing price
discrimination: (1) agencies or commissions, usually at the state level, are given authority

31 See Jordan (1972) for detailed discussion about prior market structure and the effects o f government
regulations in monopolistic, oligopolistic and competitive industries.
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to regulate rates, but it is “mission impossible” to figure out the costs of regulated firms;
(2) with the increasing complexity of economy, the costs o f effectively supervising
agencies by legislation rise over time.
Upadhyaya et al. (1997) examine the stated purpose o f the Public Interest theoiy
and the failure to produce benefits laid out by Posner: lowering prices and reducing price
discrimination in public consumption while limiting producers’ economic power.
Upadhyaya et al. show that the regulation is ineffective in reducing the price of the
electricity for 1922 and 1927. However, the study does find a negative relationship
between utility prices and regulation for the year 1932, indicating that regulation is
“somewhat successful in lowering the price of electricity.” MacAvoy (1971) supports
Posner’s conclusion that customers suffered a shortage o f natural gas due to the
reallocation of reserves to unregulated industrial users in the 1960s as a result of
inequitable price ceilings set by Federal Power Commission. All these studies provide
some evidence that the intention of regulation is for consumers’ benefit, but has little
effect in reducing prices because of ineffectiveness.

2.2.2: Capture Theory
Stigler (1971) examines the Capture theory by studying the weight limits on
trucks and occupational licensing and finds that weight limits on trucks supports the
Capture theory whereas occupational licensing does not. Stigler examines three possible
factors that might have an influence on the regulations of weight limits on trucks for all
states in 1932 and 1933: (1) the number of trucks per 1000 fanners, (2) the length of the
average railroad haul, and (3) the percentage of well-preserved highways in each state.
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These three factors represent three participatory groups: (1) farmers who own trucks for
transportation o f goods, (2) railroads that transport farm products, and (3) the public that
is most concerned about the damage from heavy trucks. The results show that these three
factors have impact on regulations of the weight limits on trucks for all states in 1932 and
1933 and “the larger the truck population in farming, the less competitive the trucks [are]
to railroads, and the better the highway system.” However, the effects of occupational
licensing do not support the Capture theory.

By contrast, Upadhyaya et al. (1997)

support the Capture theory and suggest that while regulation may initiate lower price and
reduce price discrimination for consumers’ benefit, in the long run the industry becomes
more influential in regulation, which, in turn, causes the price o f electricity to increase.
Some empirical studies support the Capture theory by providing evidence that
producers exploit price regulation to get higher profits. Peltzman (1971) finds evidence
that privately owned utilities are more likely to manipulate price control for their own
gain than are government-run utilities.

And Jordan (1972), in his study of the

effectiveness o f the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission
regulations, concludes that regulation has not effectively attenuated price discrimination
in interstate airlines, or in railroad, or in motor carriers, but in each instance “[rjegulatory
actions and procedures have allowed the carriers. . . to reach agreements regarding prices
and to enforce adherence to these agreements.” In fact, there have been significant
increases in price levels for all these. All these studies evidence that producers have
influence on the structure and process of regulation; thus, regulation is captured by
producers to gain benefits from regulation.
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2.2.3: Buffering Theory
The Buffering theory proposed by Peltzman (1976) maintains that total wealth is
distributed among participatory groups, regulation reduces firm-specific risk and possibly
systematic risk as well, and the price discrimination problem is attenuated through cross
subsidization. Whereas many researchers’ findings support the Buffering theory, others
argue that regulatory lag causes price stickiness that, in turn, increases firm-specific risk
and decreases shareholder wealth because of the fluctuation of profit streams.

Recent

empirical studies in the utility industry focus on two factors that determine stock returns:
(1) the relationship between regulation and systematic risk and firm-specific risk, and (2)
the relationship between regulation and cost of capital.
Using the relationship between daily returns and the natural log of ratios of profitmaximizing price to actual price in nine states for years 1969 and 1974 to test whether
regulation increases systematic risk for 1974, when fuel prices rose dramatically, Meyer
and Leland (1980) show that because of regulated price, rising costs associated with the
energy crisis did not result in higher systematic risk. Employing the same method of
analysis, Norton (1985) reexamines the effect of regulation on systematic risk for the
period 1969-74 using monthly data and the average of the 1969 and 1974 ratios of profitmaximizing price to actual price. Norton supports Meyer and Leland’s finding that
regulation lowers systematic risk during the period of rising costs as a result of wealth
redistribution.
Norton (1985) further examines the relationship between the intensity of
regulation, classified as unregulated, weakly regulated, and strongly regulated, and
systematic risk in the utility industry, where the intensity of regulation is determined by
32 See Joskow and MacAvoy (1975), Spann (1976), Chandrasekaran and Dukes (1981), Archer (1981).
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three factors: (1) the power of the respective commissions, (2) the size of commission
staff, and (3) the budget size. He concludes that the higher the intensity of regulation, the
lower the systematic risk.

Contrary to other research findings, Norton shows that

leverage (total debt/assets), capital intensity (net plant/total assets), diversification (total
revenue/electric operating revenues), and manufacturing intensity (manufacturing
employees/total employees) are not significant in determining systematic risk when the
intensity o f regulation is taken into account for systematic risk.
Joskow (1974), Clarke (1980) and Norton (1988) all document the fact that
regulation shifts some o f the burden of rising costs from producers to consumers, a fact
which supports the Buffering theory. Norton (1988) also examines the impact of OPEC
oil supply shock on shareholder wealth for the utility industry and finds an adverse effect
on shareholder wealth caused by the 1973 oil supply shock. But contrary to the belief
that regulatory lag amplifies the adverse effects, the adverse effects are softened by
regulation. Thus, he concludes that “shareholder wealth is endogenous to regulation” and
that a “regulation-induced buffering effect” reduces firms’ risk and, in turn, increases
shareholder wealth.
The first line of studies indicates that regulation provides a cushion for the utility
industry against unexpected changes of demand and cost. The impact of rising costs does
not trigger higher systematic risk. Since regulation sometimes shifts some of the burden
caused by rising costs from producers to consumers, it reduces the variability of stock
prices and the risk for the regulated utilities. The higher the intensity of regulation, the
lower the systematic risk. According to these studies, regulation results in increasing
shareholders’ wealth.
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Another line o f studies deals with the relationship between regulation and the cost
of capital. In the past, electric utility rates have been regulated to give customers low
rates and to allow utilities to cover the cost of service, plus a fair rate of return
(Blacconiere et al. 2000); therefore, regulators normally assume that the cost of capital is
a determinant in the regulated rate of return. However, Brennan and Schwartz (1982)
show that the expected regulatory policy determines the cost of capital in the utility
industry. Archer (1981) studies the relationship between the intensity of regulation and
the cost of capital and finds that the higher the intensity of regulation, the slower the
response to a utility’s request for rate increases and the higher the cost of capital for the
requesting utility.
The second line of studies indicates that the cost of capital is endogenous to
regulation. The higher the intensity o f regulation and the slower the response to a
utility’s request for rate increases, the higher the cost of capital for the requesting utility.
Whereas some regulatory policies reduce the cost of capital, some have adverse impact
on the cost of capital. The increased cost of capital reduces the market value of firms and
thereby decreases shareholders’ wealth.
All the above studies show that since regulatory policies have profound influence
on firm-specific risk, systematic risk, and the cost of capital, both expected earnings and
earnings’ responsiveness to market environment are affected, depending on the intensity
o f regulation and the effectiveness of regulatory policies. Utilities operating in states
with high intensity of regulation show less response to market forces than utilities
operating in states with less intensity o f regulation.
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Conversely, in a deregulation environment, producers are no longer “buffered”
from exogenous economic impact; therefore, increasing competition along with
uncertainty of expected earnings increases firms’ risks as well as systematic risk, which,
in turn, decreases shareholders’ wealth. Nwaeze (1999) examines the effects of the
deregulation act, Energy Policy Act of 1992, on the market value of earnings and asset
components for electric utilities. The uncertainty of future earnings causes managers to
take precaution when dealing with competition, and findings suggest that managers
increase capital spending to alleviate the associated risk and reduce capital intensity for
future competition. He also finds that market value of each asset component is sensitive
to the market movement and long-term interest rates. Thus, the adverse effect of the
Energy Policy Act for the incentive-regulated utilities and for those regulated by a
performance-based compensation scheme is less for traditional utilities.

Finally, the

study shows that overall deregulation of the electric utility industry causes the market
value of traditional utilities to drop.
Blacconiere et al. (2000) examine the effect of ongoing deregulation in the
electric utility industry on the relation between market value, book value, and earnings
for all investor-owned electric utilities for 1988-1996 and suggest that deregulation
influences the relevance o f financial statement information. They show that book value
becomes less important in explaining the value of a firm whereas earnings become more
important in explaining the value of a firm. Since each state has a different pace of
deregulation, the Blacconiere’ study shows that the importance o f earnings in explaining
market value increases in highly deregulated states.
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2.3; An Overview of Information Theory
and Its Empirical Studies
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama 1970) says that the market value of an
asset reflects all relevant information, which includes the information regarding the
expected cash flows, as well as the discount rate that reflects the riskiness of the expected
cash flows. Any information about the timing and the magnitudes of expected cash flows
and any changes in expected real interest rates, inflation, default risk, and various risk
premiums are quickly incorporated into the market price of the asset. Thus, information
relevant to the timing and the magnitudes of expected cash flows is idiosyncratic news
and macroeconomic news. And because this is true, market efficiency and volatility of
security returns have intrigued researchers for over three decades, especially studies that
(1) identify the relevance of information and (2) analyze the speed of price adjustment to
relevant information and volatility persistence.
The study by Patell and Wolfson (1984) analyzes the speed of price adjustment to
idiosyncratic news: earnings and dividend announcements and the volatility persistence
of stock returns. They find that it takes only five to ten minutes to adjust security prices
in response to earnings and dividend information and that return volatility continues even
into the following day.
Many studies examine the impact of macroeconomic news announcements on
different markets: (1) interest rate and foreign exchange futures markets (Ederington and
Lee 1993), (2) the British Pound, Canadian Dollar, Deutsche Mark, Japanese Yen, and
Swiss Franc currency futures markets (Christie-David et al. 2000), (3) the Municipal over
Treasury bonds, the Treasury notes over Treasury bonds, and the Treasury bills over
Eurodollar futures interest-rate spreads (Aggarwal et al. 2001), (4) the British Long Gilt,
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the German Government Bond, the Japanese Government Bond, the Italian Government
Bond, and the U. S. Treasury Bond futures (Christie-David et al. 2002).
Ederington and Lee (1993) find that the majority of the price adjustments occur
within the first minute of trading after a news announcement. But because information is
not fully incorporated into prices during the first minute, high volatility remains for at
least fifteen minutes after announcement, as more information accrues in the market, and
remains slightly elevated for several hours. They also find that the direction of price
adjustments after the first minute of trading is independent of the first-minute price
adjustment, implying that individual investors form their expectations about the future
security prices. Christie-David et al. (2000) also find that the majority of the price
adjustments occurs within the first few minutes of trading after a news announcement and
that volatilities remain high for fifteen to forty-five minutes, depending on respective
markets. In the studies o f Aggarwal et al. (2001) and Christie-David et al. (2002),
however, the results show that it takes considerable time, varying from fifteen to seventyfive minutes, for the prices to adjust fully to a relevant news announcement.
It has been demonstrated that different markets react differently to
macroeconomic news announcements.

For instance, Jain (1988) shows that security

prices respond to the release o f the consumer price index (CPI) and the money supply.
Ederington and Lee (1993) find that the employment report, the producer price index
(PPI), the CPI, and the durable goods orders had the greatest impact on interest rates in
the 1988 to 1991 period. One study also shows that the PPI and the CPI affect Gilt and
Bund futures (Christie-David et al. 2002). In another study, Flannery and Protopapadakis
(2002) examine the impact o f real macroeconomic variables on aggregate equity returns
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and find that the CPI, the PPI, a Monetary Aggregate, Balance of Trade, Employment
Report, and Housing Starts affect the aggregate equity returns.

2.4: Summary
The market value o f an asset reflects all available relevant information; that is,
information which includes the expected cash flows and the discount rates reflecting the
riskiness of these expected cash flows. Since regulation provides a buffer for the utility
industry against unexpected changes of demand and cost, the riskiness of a utility’s
expected cash flows is reduced, a fact which, in turn, increases the market values of
utilities. Many empirical studies support the position that regulation reduces systematic
risk and firm-specific risk; therefore, yielding evidence that producers are buffered by
regulation and that regulated firms are less responsive to exogenous impact. However,
the utility industry has been moving toward deregulation in retail market since 1994,
when each state took control of its own pace of deregulation (Blacconiere et al. 2000). If
the Buffering theory holds, then the stock prices are less sensitive to the arrival of
information in a regulated environment. Thus, the response to economic forces and
idiosyncratic news in a regulated environment is weaker than that in a deregulated
environment.

For this reason, those utilities operating in highly deregulated states

respond to economic forces and idiosyncratic news more strongly than those operating in
less deregulated or regulated states.

I am not aware of any article studying the

differences of responses to macroeconomic news and idiosyncratic news for firms in any
industry that operate in a regulated environment and that later move into a deregulated
environment. My conjecture is (1) that the economic forces and idiosyncratic news will
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have less influence on utilities before deregulation than after deregulation and (2) that the
responses to economic forces and idiosyncratic news are weaker in a regulated
environment. Since the pace of deregulation in utilities varies among all states, the speed
o f price adjustment to economic forces and idiosyncratic news and the volatility
persistence will be different. My conjecture is that the responses to economic forces and
idiosyncratic news are stronger in a highly deregulated environment than those responses
in a less deregulated or regulated environment.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1: Identification of Two Categories of Utilities
Empirical studies indicate that regulation provides a cushion for the utility
industry against exogenous economic impact, thereby reducing the variability of stock
prices and the risk for the regulated utilities. In other words, firms that operate in a
regulated environment are less responsive to economic forces and idiosyncratic news.
After the industry has been deregulated, these firms are not “buffered” by the regulation;
thus, they become more responsive to economic forces and idiosyncratic news. Some
studies also indicate that the higher the intensity of regulation, the lower the systematic
risk and firm-specific risk. In other words, highly deregulated firms normally face higher
risk because they respond to exogenous factors more quickly and more strongly than less
deregulated firms.

However, the success of deregulation depends largely on each

individual state’s restructuring plans because each state establishes its own level and pace
of deregulation.
In an effort to provide policy makers with empirical evidence regarding the
impact of deregulation and the relative effectiveness of each state’s restructuring plan, I
have selected the year 2001 as the year after deregulation and the year 1994 as the year

33
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before deregulation.

Given the fact that each state establishes its own pace of

deregulation, I then identify two categories of utilities in order to examine the differences
of responses to news releases in 2001:
(i) Utilities providing electricity to states that are considered to be moving
successfully toward a competitive retail market.
(ii) Utilities providing electricity to states that have rejected the implementation of
customer-choice models.
First, I identify states that are moving toward to a competitive retail market and
states that have regressed. My sample is based on the Retail Energy Deregulation (RED)
Index, 2nd edition, July 2001, from the Center for the Advancement of Energy Markets.
The RED Index ranks states (SO states and the District of Columbia) using 22 attributes
that affect the transition from a monopolistic model to a customer-choice model, and
measures each state's progress in its development of policies related to retail energy
competition. A detailed list of the ranks and the index scores for SO states and the
District of Columbia, along with a list of the attributes used to determine index scores,
are included in Appendix I, Exhibit 3-1 and 3-2. The index scores used in ranking the
states are as follows:
(1)

An index score o f 0 indicates that a state maintains the traditional
monopolistic model.

(2)

An index score of 100 indicates that a state has completely and
effectively implemented the customer-choice model.

(3)

A negative index score indicates that a state explicitly rejects all
restructuring plans in the retail energy market.
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In order to test the effectiveness of deregulation, I then non-randomly select my
analysis states from the extreme ends of the ranking distribution. I select utilities from
states with highest ranking and positive scores (Positive Rank Group) and utilities from
states with the lowest ranking and negative score (Negative Rank Group). The Positive
Rank Group consists o f states that are highly deregulated, and the Negative Rank Group
consists o f states that have explicitly rejected all restructuring plans.

For instance,

Pennsylvania is ranked number one among all states with a score of 66, indicating that
Pennsylvania is implementing a customer-choice model successfully. Texas comes right
after Pennsylvania with a rank two and score of 65.

Nebraska, Colorado, Idaho,

Alabama, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Mississippi are tied with rank 51 and a score of -8,
indicating that these states have rejected implementation of a customer-choice model.
Some states are ranked 28 with a score of 0 because these states have not explicitly
rejected the idea o f restructuring electricity retail markets, yet maintain the traditional
monopolistic model.
Second, I identify utilities that provide electricity predominantly to the Positive
Rank Group states and the Negative Rank Group states, but not both, using the following
criteria:
(1)

At least 65% of the revenues of the utility companies come from the
retail sales of electricity.33

(2)

The utilities selected in the Positive Rank Group provide at least
50% of retail sales of electricity to Positive Rank Group states and
not more than 5% to the Negative Rank Group states. Similarly, the

33 Some utility companies operate as holding companies with subsidiaries in other businesses, but the
income from such enterprises is secondary to the income from the sale o f electricity. For instance, 32%
o f Otter Tail Corp.'s operating income comes from nonutility subsidiaries.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36

utilities selected in the Negative Rank Group provide at least 50% of
retail sales of electricity to the Negative Rank Group states and not
more than 5% to the Positive Rank Group states.
(3)

The utilities’ stock is publicly traded.

Details of service areas and the percentage of revenues from each service area are
obtained from the Value Line Investment Survey, Volume 56, 2001. Using the criteria
stated above, I select three utilities to put into the Positive Rank Group and three utilities
to put into the Negative Rank Group. This selection procedure is as follows: I first
identify all utilities that provide electricity to the highest-ranking state, Pennsylvania.
Three are identified as DQE, Inc., GPU, Inc., and PPL Corporation, but I select only
DQE, Inc. and PPL Corporation. Even though GPU, Inc., does provide electricity to
customers in Pennsylvania, 53% o f the revenue comes from the sale of electricity to New
Jersey, which holds a ranking of seven. I then move to the next-highest ranking state,
Texas, and identify two utilities that meet the criteria: TXU Corp. and El Paso Electric
Co. Among these four utilities in the Positive Rank Group, El Paso Electric Co. is the
only one that provides electricity to more than one state: 65% o f its revenues come from
serving Texas, 17% of revenues from serving New Mexico with a positive rank of
twenty-four, and 18% o f revenues from wholesale electricity. Since El Paso Electric Co.
meets the selection criteria and does not provide electricity to any Negative Rank Group
state, it is included in the sample.

Second, I identify three companies that provide

electricity to the states with the lowest rank of fifty-one and with the score -8: Idacorp,
Inc., Cleco Corporation, and Otter Tail Corp. Even though 49% of the retail electricity
revenues of Otter Tail Corp. comes ftom serving North Dakota and South Dakota with a
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positive rank of 28 and a score of 0, these are states that are still implementing the
traditional monopolistic model. The inclusion of the Otter Tail Corp. will still provide
insights of the effectiveness o f deregulation; therefore, all three utilities are placed in the
Negative Rank Group. Third, I examine the financial data of these seven utilities from
Compact Disclosure and find that the total asset of TXU Corp. is substantially larger
compared to the rest of the utilities. To alleviate the bias, probably caused by size, TXU
Corp. is excluded from my sample. As a result, I have included three utilities in the
Positive Rank Group and three in the Negative Rank Group. Since some companies in
2001 are the result of mergers and acquisitions in the late 90s, I then identify all
companies’ predecessors, together with their ticker symbols and exchange information
through the following three resources: (1) each company’s daily news from April 1 to
June 30, 1994, from Bloomburg database using the current ticker symbol as the search
key; (2) the history of each company, when available, listed on its web site; and (3)
Compact-Disclosure, April-June 1994. As a result, I identify changes in ticker symbols,
in company names, and in trading exchanges. For instance, El Paso Electric is traded in
American Stock Exchange using EE as its ticker symbol in 2001, but was exchanged in
DASDAQ using a different ticker symbol (ELPAQ) in 1994. PPL Corporation has a
different name, Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., in 1994. The final list of selected
utilities for the year 2001, together with states they are headquartered in, state rank, total
assets, and debt-to-equity ratio as of the December 2000 (the year preceding the sample
period), service areas and corresponding rankings and revenue sources for both groups is
included in Table la. Table lb shows the corresponding information for all utilities in
1994.
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Table 1a: List of Utilities and Related Details for 2001
Total Assets
(000s)
As of Dec "00

Utility Name

Ticker

State
Headquartered in

State Rank in 2001

Debt to Equity
Service Area[Rank](% Revenues from Electricity)
As of D ec'00

DOE. INC.

DQE

PA

1

3,844,245

1.81

Pittsburgh and municipalities in western Pennsylvania[1]

PPL Corporation

PPL

PA

1

12,360,000

2.27

Eastern & central Pennsylvania[1]

El Paso Electric Co.

EE

TX

2

1,660,105

1.88

Western Texas(2](65%), Southern New Mexico[24](17%); wholesale
counts 18% of revenues.

Idacorp, Inc.

IDA

ID

51

4,040,000

1.10

ldaho[51](86%), Oregon[20](4%), Nevada[23](,1%); wholesale counts
9% of revenues.

Cisco Corporation

CNL

LA

51

1,753,320

1.44

Central Louisiana[51]

Otter Tal Corp.

OTTR

MN

51

737,708

0.71

Minnesota[51](51% of retail elec. revenues), North Dakota[28](41% of
retail elec. revenues), South Dakota[28](8% of retail elec. revenues);
Nonutilify subsidiaries accounted for 32% of '00 operating income.

Source of utilities is the Value Line Investment Survey (Volume 56,2001)
To be included in the sample the following criteria must be m et
(1) At least 65% of the revenues of the utilities come from the retail sale of electricity.
(2) The utlities selected in the Positive Rank Group provide at least 50% of their electricity to the Positive Rank Group states and not more than 5% to the Negative Rank Group states.
The utilities selected in the Negative Rank Group provide at least 50% of their electricity to the Negative Rank Group states and not more than 5% to the Positive Rank Group states.
(3) The unify companies' stock is publicly traded.

U>
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Table 1b: List of Utilities and Related Details for 1994
Total Assets
(000s)
As of Dec S3

UtiltyName

Ticker

State
Headquartered in

State Rank in 2001

Debt to Equity
Service Area(% Revenues from Electricity)
As of Dec -93

DQE

DQE

PA

1

4.574.041

1.07

Pittsburgh and municipalities in western Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.

PPL

PA

1

9,454.113

0.91

Eastern & central Pennsylvania

El Paso Electric Co.

ELPAQ

TX

2

1,715.406

-5.42

Texas(64%). New Mexico(19%), FERC(17%)

Idaho Power Co.

IDA

ID

51

2,097,417

0.87

ldaho(87%), Oregon(5%), Nevada(less than 1%); wholesale counts 7%
of revenues.

Central Louisiana Electric Co. Inc.

CNL

LA

51

1,161,635

0.96

Central Louisiana

Otter Tail Power Co.

OTTR

MN

51

563,905

0.84

Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota; Nonutility subsidiaries
accounted for 27% of *93 revenues.

Source of utilities is the Value Line Investment Survey (Volume 49,1994)
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3.2: Data Description for Quotes and Trades
Once utilities are identified, I then gather trades and quotes data for each utility. I
obtain intraday transaction data for bid prices, ask prices, bid sizes (bid volumes),ask
sizes (ask volumes), trading prices, trading sizes (trading volumes), and time of trading
from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, New York Stock Exchange, Inc., for the
sample period of April to June in 1994.

The TAQ database contains a trade file and a

quote file for each stock. The selection of the 2001 data allows me to conduct several
tests to study the responses to macroeconomic news and idiosyncratic news for the
Positive Rank Group utilities and the Negative Rank Group utilities, after deregulation
across states. I also conduct the same tests using sample data from April to June 1994 to
strengthen my inferences because the 1994 sample conveys information relating the
responses to news releases before deregulation. For both groups-the Positive Rank
Group and the Negative Rank Group-I then obtain or calculate the following seven
variables for each month, day, hour, minute, and second for the sample period from the
open of trading at 9:30 a.m. to the close of trading at 4:00 p.m. These are the variables:
1. BAS = bid-ask spread = —
— * 1000
(ask+ bid)/ 2
2. BSZ= bid size (based on 100 share units)
3. OSZ = ask size (based on 100 share units)
4. TSZ = trade size (actual number o f shares traded)
5. NOBSm= the number of transactions traded at minute m.
6. TBT = time between trades in seconds
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p
7. RTN5 = ln( —^ )* 100 where P5 is the trading price traded at date d, hour h,
P ,.

minute m, and second s and P,./ is the first price traded preceding the current
second.
There are 391 minutes between 9:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (including 9:30 a.m.);
thus, an activity occurring in the first minute after trading starts represents a 9:30 a.m.
activity, and an activity occurring 391 minutes after trading starts represents a 4:00 p.m.
activity.
3.3; Macroeconomic News and Idiosyncratic News
In order to compare the responses to economic forces and idiosyncratic news of
the utilities in 2001 that serve the Positive Rank Group with the utilities that serve the
Negative Rank Group, and to examine the responses to economic forces and idiosyncratic
news in 1994, I secure macroeconomic news and idiosyncratic news from DowJones
Newswires database for the period of April 2 to June 29 of 2001 (63 trading days)34,
macroeconomic news from Money Market Service and idiosyncratic news from
Bloomburg for the period of April 1 to June 30 of 1994 (62 trading days). Twenty-two
major macroeconomic news releases are used as measures of market forces. There are 67
news announcements for twenty-two types of macroeconomic news during the sample
period of 2001, whereas there are 68 news announcements for the same types of
macroeconomic news during the sample period o f 1994. I then separate days that have
news releases from days that do not have any news releases, using a two-step filtering
procedure.

34 To avoid the contamination o f the electricity crisis occurring in the Western region o f the U.S. caused by
the shortage of electricity in California during the winter o f 2000-2001,1 select April-June 2001 after the
rolling blackout problems were corrected.
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A schematic diagram (Figure 1) illustrates the procedure used to separate
transaction data from a trade file of any given utility into the announcement days file (the
AD file), the nonannouncement days file (the NAD file), and the special announcement
days file (the SAD file). The same procedure also applies to a quote file for any given
utility. In the first step o f separation, I use macroeconomic news releases as the
separation key. All trades that occur on days having at least one macroeconomic news
announcement are classified as Macroeconomic Announcement Days (see MACAD in
Figure 1). It is possible that these announcement days might include idiosyncratic news.
If macroeconomic news is released after the close of trading or on holidays, such as Good
Friday and Memorial Day, or on regular trading days closed for special reasons, I assume
the impact of this release will be manifested on the next trading day; thus, these (next)
days are classified as Macroeconomic Special Announcement Days (MACSAD). All
other days are classified as Macroeconomic Nonannouncement Days (MACNAD). With
macroeconomic news announcements days in 2001

and 1994, there are 35

Announcement Days, 27 Nonannouncement Days and one Special Announcement Day in
2001; there are 38 Announcement Days, 24 Nonannouncement Days, and no Special
Announcement Days in 1994. A list of macroeconomic news forecasts, actual release
values, and release times is included in Table 2a for the year 2001 and 2b for the year
1994.
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TRADES FILE

FILTER I
MACNEWS

MACAD

MACNAD

MACSAD

FILTER 2
COMPANY NEWS

COMSAD

COMAD

AD

NAD

SAD
DISCARD

Figure 1: A Schematic Diagram of a Two-step Filtering Procedure
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Table 2a: List o f Twentv-two Macroeconomic Announcements Aoril-June 2001
A listing of macroeconomic news forecasts, actual release values, and release times are obtained from the
Dow Jones News Retrieval Service.
Announcement
Consumer Price Index

Release Date
17 Apr
16 May
15 Jun
Durable Goods Orders
25 Apr
25 May
26 Jun
Gross Domestic Product 27 Apr
25 May
29 Jun
Producer Price Index
12 Apr
11 May
14 Jun
6 Apr
Hourly Earnings
4 May
1 Jun
6 Apr
NonFarm Payroll
4 May
1 Jun
Unemployment Rate
6 Apr
4 May
1 Jun
Housing Starts
17 Apr
16 May
19 Jun
Retail Sales
12 Apr
11 May
13 Jun
18 Apr
Trade Deficit (Gap)
18 May
21 Jun
18 Apr
Leading Indicators
17 May
20 Jun
Personal Income
30 Apr
29 May
Personal Expenditures
30 Apr
29 May
17 Apr
Capacity Utilization
14 May
15 Jun

Release Time
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
10:00 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
9:15 EDT
9:15 EDT
9:15 EDT

Forecast
+0.1%
+0.5%
+0.4%
+0.5%
-2.2%
+0.5%
+1.0% Q1A
+1.4% Q1P
+1.2% Q1F
0%
+0.4%
+0.3%
+0.3%
+0.4%
+0.3%
+60,000
+25,000
-25,000
4.3%
4.4%
4.6%
-1.3%(1.613m)
-0.8%(1.6m)
-0.6%(1.6m)
+0.1%
+0.2%
+0.1%
$32.6 bn
$29 bn
$31 bn
-0.3%
+0.1%
+0.3%
+0.4%
+0.2%
+0.2%
+0.4%
79.1%
78.9%
77.9%

Actual
+0.1%
+0.3%
+0.4%
+3.0%
-5.0%
+2.9%
+2.0%
+1.3%
+1.2%
-0.1%
+0.3%
+0.1%
+0.4%
+0.4%
+0.28%
-86,000
-223,000
-19,000
4.3%
4.5%
4.4%
-1.3%( 1.625m)
+1.5%(1.609m)
-0.4%( 1.622m)
-0.2%
+0.8%
+0.1%
$26.99 bn
$33.08 bn
$32.17 bn
-0.3%
+0.1%
+0.5%
+0.5%
+0.3%
+0.3%
+0.4%
79.4%
78.5%
77.4%

Surprise
0%
-0.2%
0%
+2.5%
-2.8%
+2.4%
+1.0%
-0.1%
0%
-0.1%
-0.1%
-0.2%
+0.1%
0%
-0.02%
-146,000
-248,000
+6,000
0%
+0.1%
-0.2%
0%
+2.3%
+0.2%
-0.3%
+0.6%
0%
-$5.61bn
$4.08 bn
$1.17 bn
0%
0%
+0.2%
+0.1%
+0.1%
+0.1%
0%
+0.3%
-0.4%
-0.5%

Surprise is the difference between the value released by the governmental (private) agency and the
forecasted value.
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Table 2a: List o f Twenty-two Macroeconomic Announcements April-June 2001
A listing of macroeconomic news forecasts, actual release values, and release times are obtained from the
Dow Jones News Retrieval Service.
Announcement
Industrial Production

Construction Spending

Factory Orders

NAPM Survey

Business Inventories

US Treasury Budget

Consumer Credit

New Home Sales

Release Date
17 Apr
14 May
15 Jun
2 Apr
1 May
1 Jun
3 Apr
2 May
5 Jun
2 Apr
4 Apr
1 May
3 May
1 Jun
5 Jun
13 Apr
14 May
14 Jun
19 Apr
18 May
20 Jun
6 Apr
7 May
7 Jun
25 Apr
24 May
26 Jun

Release Time
9:15 EDT
9:15 EDT
9:15 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
15:49 EDT
15:13 EDT
15:07 EDT
15:00 EDT
15:00 EDT
15:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT

Forecast
-0.1%
-0.3%
-0.4%
+0.3%
+0.5%
0%
-3.8% (TTE)
+1.5%
-2.8%
42.3
Non-Mfg
44.0
Non-Mfg
43.5
Non-Mfg
-0.1%
-0.2% (TTE)
+0.1%
Summary
Summary
Summary
$16.0 bn (TTE)
$9.8 bn (TTE)
$9.0 bn (TTE)
910,000
975,000
900,000

Actual
+0.4%
-0.3%
-0.6%
+0.6%
+1.3%
+0.3%
-0.4%
+1.8%
-3.0%
43.1
50.3
43.2
47.1
42.1
46.6
- 0.2%
- 0.3%
0.0%
-$50,662 bn
$189,796 bn
-$27,919 bn
$13.5 bn
$6.16 bn
$13.9 bn
1,021,000
894,000
928,000

Surprise
+0.5%
0%
-0.2%
+0.3%
+0.8%
+0.3%
+2.8%
+0.3%
-0.2%
0.8
No
-0.8
Yes
-1.4
No
-0.1%
-0.1%
-0.1%

-$2.5 bn
-$3.64 bn
+$3.9 bn
+111,000
-81,000
+28,000

Surprise is the difference between the value released by the governmental (private) agency and the
forecasted value.
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Table 2b: List o f Twentv-two Macroeconomic Announcements Aoril-June 1994
A listing o f macroeconomic news forecasts, actual release values, and release times are obtained from the
Money Market Service.
Announcement
Consumer Price Index

Release Date
13 Apr
13 May
14 Jun
Durable Goods Orders
28 Apr
25 May
23 Jun
Gross Domestic Product 28 Apr
27 May
29 Jun
12 Apr
Producer Price Index
12 May
10 Jun
Hourly Earnings
1 Apr
6 May
3 Jim
NonFarm Payroll
1 Apr
6 May
3 Jun
Unemployment Rate
1 Apr
6 May
3 Jun
20 Apr
Housing Starts
17 May
16 Jun
13 Apr
Retail Sales
12 May
14 Jun
Trade Balance
19 Apr
19 May
21 Jun
Leading Indicators
5 Apr
3 May
2 Jun
Personal Income
1 Apr
29 Apr
31 May
30 Jun
Personal Expenditures
1 Apr
29 Apr
31 May
30 Jun
Capacity Utilization
15 Apr
16 May
15 Jun

Release Time
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
9:15 EDT
9:15 EDT
9:15 EDT

Forecast
+0.3%
+0.3%
+0.3%
+1.0%
+1.0%
+0.5%
+3.3% Q1A
+2.5% Q1P
+3.0% Q1F
+0.2%
+0.2%
+0.2%
+0.3%
+0.2%
+0.3%
+79,500
-54,500
+100,000
6.5%
6.5%
6.4%
+7.58%( 1.42m)
+2.11%(1.45m)
-1.38%( 1.43m)
+1.0%
+0.3%
0%
-$9.25 bn
-$11.5 bn
-$10.5 bn
-0.2%
+0.6%
0%
+0.8%
+0.7%
+0.45%
+0.6%
+0.7%
+0.5%
+0.1%
+0.2%
83.8%
83.7%
83.5%

Actual
Surmise
0%
+0.3%
-0.2%
+0.1%
+0.2%
-0.1%
+0.4%
-0.6%
+0.1%
-0.9%
+0.4%
+0.9%
+2.6%
-0.7%
+3.0%
+0.5%
+3.4%
+0.4%
0%
+0.2%
-0.1%
-0.3%
-0.1%
-0.3%
-0.2%
+0.1%
+0.1%
+0.3%
+0.2%
+0.5%
+239,000
+159,500
-189,000
-134,500
-76,000
-176,000
6.5%
0%
6.4%
-0.1%
-0.4%
6.0%
+12.21 %(1.47m)+4.63%
-0.68%( 1.46m) -2.79%
+3.42%(1.51m) +4.8%
+0.4%
-0.6%
-1.1%
-0.8%
-0.2%
-0.2%
-$12.40 bn
-$3.15 bn
-$10.1 bn
+$1.4 bn
-$12 bn
-$1.5 bn
-0.1%
+0.1%
+0.7%
+0.1%
0%
0%
+1.3%
+0.5%
-0.1%
+0.6%
-0.05%
+0.4%
0%
+0.6%
+1.0%
+0.3%
+0.4%
-0.1%
-0.2%
-0.1%
+0.4%
+0.2%
-0.2%
83.6%
-0.1%
83.6%
0%
83.5%

Surprise is the difference between the value released by the governmental (private) agency and the
forecasted value.
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Table 2b: List o f Twentv-two Macroeconomic Announcements April-June 1994
A listing o f macroeconomic news forecasts, actual release values, and release times are obtained from the
Money Market Service.
Announcement
Industrial Production

Construction Spending

Factory Orders

NAPM Survey

Business Inventories

US Treasury Budget

Consumer Credit

New Home Sales

Release Date
15 Apr
16 May
15 Jun
1 Apr
2 May
1 Jun
4 May
2 Jun
30 Jun
4 Apr
2 May
1 Jun
14 Apr
13 May
15 Jun
21 Apr
20 May
21 Jun
7 Apr
6 May
7 Jun
29 Apr
31 May
28 Jun

Release Time
9:15 EDT
9:15 EDT
9:15 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
8:30 EDT
15:00 EDT
15:00 EDT
15:00 EDT
15:00 EDT
15:00 EDT
15:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT
10:00 EDT

Forecast
+0.7%
+0.3%
+0.1%
+0%
+2.0%
+1.0%
+0.5%
+0.3%
+0.6%
58.0
56.5
57.2
+0.3%
+0.2%
+0.3%
-$35 bn
$17 bn
-$32.25 bn
$6.5 bn
$4.8 bn
$5.6 bn
700,000
725,000
679,000

Actual
+0.5%
+0.3%
+0.2%
-1.2%
+0.8%
+0.6%
+1.1%
-0.1%
+0.6%
56.7
57.7
57.7
+0.5%
-0.2%
+0.2%
-$32.30 bn
$17.40 bn
-$32.10 bn
$3.5 bn
$7.4 bn
$8.9 bn
739,000
683,000
738,000

Surmise
-0.2%
0%
+0.1%
-1.2%
-1.2%
-0.4%
+0.6%
-0.4%
0%
-1.3
+1.2
+0.5
+0.2%
-0.4%
-0.1%
+$2.70 bn
+$0.40 bn
+$0.15 bn
-$3.0 bn
+$2.6 bn
+$3.3 bn
+39,000
-42,000
+59,000

Surprise is the difference between the value released by the governmental (private) agency and the
forecasted value.
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Even though Macroeconomic Nonannouncement Days are free of macroeconomic
news, it is possible, and very likely, that idiosyncratic news announcements are released
during these days too. These nonannouncement days are then subjected to a second filter
that divides them into days that have at least one company announcement (COMAD) and
days that have no company or macroeconomic announcement (NAD). To incorporate
idiosyncratic news release days into Announcement Days, I first classify idiosyncratic
news into two groups: Primary News and Secondary News. Primary News includes
firms’ earnings forecasts, earnings surprises, earnings announcements, dividends
announcements, merger and acquisition related news, stock splits and buyback news, and
regulatory news. Secondary News refers to subsidiary news, industry-wide news, and
cross-firms, and competitors* news. I assume that the primary news released during the
morning before trading starts or during trading time produces a major impact on stock
prices; therefore, I include it in Company Announcement Days (COMAD). Secondary
News and Primary News released the preceding day(s) before trading time or on holidays
are assumed to produce a minor impact on stock prices; therefore, I include them in
Company Special Announcement

Days

(COMSAD).

Thus,

Macroeconomic

Nonannouncement Days show neither macroeconomic news announcements nor any
company-specific primary or secondary news announcements and are named
Nonannouncement Days (NAD). I then merge Macroeconomic Announcement Days
(MACAD) and Company Announcement Days (COMAD) into Announcement Days
(AD), and Macroeconomic Special Announcement Days and Company Special
Announcement Days into Special Announcement Days (SAD).

After the two-step

filtering procedure, each utility has different sets of Announcement Days (AD file),
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Special Announcement Days (SAD file), and Nonannouncement Days (NAD file) for the
years 1994 and 2001.
The Nonannouncement Days (NADs) are used as a control group in many of my
testing procedures. To avoid any contaminating effects, I discard the SAD file and
compare only the responses o f stock prices to exogenous impact from macroeconomic
news and primary idiosyncratic news between the AD file and the NAD file in 1994 and
2001, respectively, for all six utilities. A list of company-specific news and release times
is included in Table 3.
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Table 3a: Company-specific News for Utilities April-June 2001

News releases for all six utilities for the period April 1, 2001 to June 30, 2001 on the Dow Jones News
Retrieval Service (DJNS) are tracked. Forward-looking Information in the releases is categorized into three
types - regulatory [R], primary [P] and secondary [S]. Regulatory information includes all information
relating to regulation in the industry. Primary information includes all information relating to earnings,
dividends, mergers and acquisitions, stock splits, and buybacks. Secondary information includes
subsidiary, industry, cross-firm, competitor, and other information not included in the primary category. In
the category o f other information, included are information releases that provide unconfirmed information
and information unlikely to have an impact on stock prices. Information is also identified by release time.
Information released during trading hours (9:30 a.m EST - 4:00 p.m. EST) is denoted by [T], information
released in the morning before trading is denoted [1], information released i days before a trading day is
denoted -/ where i= l,2 ,3 ,
Primary information is denoted by [P], regulatory information is denoted by
[R], and secondary information is denoted by [S]. For example, information that is secondary and released
the night before a trading day will be denoted [S,-l].
DOE. Inc.. (Deregulated!
Date
Time
30 Apr 18:44 ET
15 May 15:55 ET
24 May 16:07 ET
PPL Corn. (Deregulated)
Date
Time
24 Apr 15:43 ET
24 Apr 15:43 ET
24 Apr 15:46 ET
24 Apr 15:49 ET
24 Apr 16:11 ET
15 June 23:48 ET

Details
IQ net 22c a share vs. 82c [P,-l]
Sparkling Water buys Pure Water, Polaris from DQE. [S,T]
Quarterly regular dividend 42c, payable 7/1/01, record 6/8 [P,-l]

Details
IQ Net $ 1.52/share [P,T]
PPL to securitize U.S. Electricity Delivery Co. [P,T]
PPL maintains $1.06/share annual dividend [P,T]
PPL to separate PPL electric utilities [P,T]
First Call produced a mean earnings estimate o f $3.66 a share for 2001 and
$4.01 for 2002. [P,-l]
PPL registered a 54% gain in IQ net income, to $222M, or $1.52 a share, from
$142M, or 99 cents, a year earlier, as operating revenues climbed to $1.6B, from
$1.4B. For the current quarter, the consensus o f analyst estimates reported by
First Call runs to 77 cents a share, up from 64 cents in last year's June quarter.
[P>-3]

El Paso Electric (Deregulated!
Date
Time
Details
23 Apr 6:01 ET
IQ Oper Net 36c a diluted share. [P,l]
Idacoro. Inc. /Regulated)
Date
Time
Details
4 May
5:00 ET
IQ Net 93c a share vs. $1.12. [P,l]
4 May
5:07 ET
On May 1, 2001, the Idaho Public Utility Commission granted Idaho Power
Company a S168.3M PCA rate increase effective immediately. The balance of
the original request, $59.1M, has been deferred pending a formal hearing. It is
expected that an order will be issued by August 23,2001. [R,l]
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Cleco Coro. (Regulated)
Date
Time
2 Apr 14:34 ET
27 Apr 15:18 ET
1 May

16:17ET

Details
Cleco sells electric power unit assets to Quanta Svc.[P,T]
Cleco stock split approved by shareholders.Cleco boosts regular quarterly
dividend to 43.5c from 42.5c [P,T]
IQ Net continuous ops 51c a share vs. 46c [P,-l]

Otter Tail Corp. (Regulated!
Date
10 Apr
23 Apr

Time
14:59ET
17:02ET

Details
Otter declares 26c regular quarterly dividend. [P,T]
IQ Net 45c/share vs. 43c/share. [P,-l]
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Table 3b: Company-specific News for Utilities April-June 1994

News releases pertaining to all six utilities for the period April 1,1994 to June 30,1994 on the Bloomberg
Professional Service are tracked. Forward-looking Information in the releases is categorized into three
types - regulatory [R], primary [P] and secondary [S]. Regulatory information includes all information
relating to regulation in the industry. Primary information includes all information relating to earnings,
dividends, mergers and acquisitions, stock splits, and buybacks. Secondary information includes
subsidiary, industry, cross-firm, competitor, and other information not included in the primary category. In
the category o f other information, included are information releases that provide unconfirmed information
and information unlikely to have an impact on stock prices. Information is also identified by release time.
Information released during trading hours (9:30 a.m. EST - 4:00 p.m. EST) is denoted by [T], information
released in the morning before trading is denoted [1], information released i days before a trading day is
denoted where /=1,2,3,
Primary information is denoted by [P], regulatory information is denoted by
[R], and secondary information is denoted by [S]. For example, information that is secondary and released
the night before a trading day will be denoted [S,-l].
DOE. Inc..
Date
Time
15 Apr 16:08 EDT

10 May 13:29 EDT

24 May
28June

14:03 EDT
13:13 EDT

Details
DQE issued earnings. Three months ended March 31: EPS $0.70 vs. $0.65,
Dividend per share $0.42 vs. $0.40; Twelve months ended March 31: EPS
$2.77 vs. $2.68, Dividend per share $1.64 vs. $1.56; Duquesne Light Co.'s total
sales to customers: three months ended March 31: 3.1 billion vs. 2.99 billion a
year age. [P,-3]
Duquesne Capital L. P. filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission to
sell as much as $150 million o f preferred securities and plans to lend the
proceeds to its parent company, Duquesne Light Co., in exchange for monthly
income subordinated debentures. Duquesne Light, a unit of DQE Co., will in
turn use the proceeds to repay, redeem or purchase its outstanding
securities.[S,T]
Quarterly dividend $.42, payable 7/1/94, record 6/10 [P,T]
Quarterly dividend for preference stock $.70, payable 10/1/94, record 9/9 [P,T]

Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
Date
Time
Details
27 Apr 10:03 EDT
Pennsylvania Power & Light (Ticker: PPL) reported 12 months earnings ended
March 31 $2.07 vs. $2.04; sales to service-area customers rose 5.5% in the 12
months ended March 31. For the IQ earnings: 70 cents vs. the same earnings a
year ago. Since NYSE was closed on April 27 due to the funeral o f Richard M.
Nixon, the impact of this news would be on the next trading day, April 28. [P,!]•

20 May 09:37 EDT

25 May 16:04 EDT
27 May 10:32 EDT

PPL was cut to intermediate and long-term "neutral" from "above average" by
Merrill Lynch & Co. analyst Doris Kelley. The analyst estimates the utility will
earn from $2.05 to $2.10 per share in 1994, and from $1.9 to $2.05 per share in
1995. The analyst said the company’s $1.2 increase in the annual dividend in
February will "be the last dividend increase for the next several year,". [P,T]
PPL declared the regular quarterly dividend o f 41.75 cents, payable 7/1, record
6/10. Quarterly dividends on its preferred stock are also declared. [P,-1]
PPL was lowered to "underperform" from "neutral" today at Kidder, Peabody &
Co. by analyst Steven Fleishman because of a poor outlook for both earnings
and dividend growth, "in our opinion, the current stock price does not reflect the
company's declining earnings outlook and lack o f dividend prospects going
forward,” Fleishman wrote in a report. Kidder forecasts operating earnings will
fall to $2.05 a share this year and $1.95 a share in 1995 from last year's $2.19.
Earnings are expected to suffer again in 1996.[P,T]
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El Paso Electric
Date
Time
7 Apr 20:03 EDT

18 May 17:18 EDT
23 May 14:47 EDT

Idacoro Power Inc.
Date
Time
2 May
7:21 EDT

30 June 15:38 EDT

Details
El Paso Electric could end up paying $53 million to attorneys, advisers and
mediators in its bankruptcy reorganization case if a judge approves bonuses
sought today. [P,-l]
EE reported a net loss o f 37 cents vs. $3.2 a year ago. [P,-l]
Central and South West Corporation proposed a rate plan that will extend a
freeze in electric base rates for customers of El Paso Electric in Southern New
Mexico and will reduce current rates for more than 8,200 low-income
households once Central and South West's pending merger with El Paso Electric
is completed. It is an effort to retain the right to supply power to the city of Las
Cruces. [P,l]

Details
IQ earnings 44 cents vs. 55 cents. The company has proposed a one-year 2.5%
power cost adjustment, which would generate an estimated $9.8 million in
additional revenue during the 12-month period beginning May 16. [P,l]
Idaho Power filed its first general rate increase request with the Idaho PUC since
1985 in order to make customers' rates more reflective of nine years worth of
changes in company costs, investments and expenses. [P,T]

Central Louisiana Electric Co. Inc.
Details
Date
Time
Central Louisiana Electric Co. increased its quarterly cash dividend to 36.5 cents
22 Apr 14:02 EDT
a share from 35.5 cents, payable 5/15, record 5/2. The board also declared
regular quarterly dividends on all issues of preferred stock. A dividend
reinvestment plan is available which allows dividends on its common preferred
stock to be reinvested in additional shares of common stock at market price,
without commission costs. [P,T]
IQ earnings 36 cents vs. 31 cents. 12 months ended March 31: $1.83 vs. $1.95;
2 May 16:01 EDT
EPS (diluted) $1.77 vs. $1.88. [P,-l]
Otter Tail Power Corp.
Date
Time
20 Apr 17:25 EDT

Details
IQ earnings 78 cents vs. 75 cents [P,-l]
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3.4 Research Design.

3.4.1: Testing the Difference of Means and Variances
For information purposes, I use a two-sample t-test to determine whether the
market reacts differently to macroeconomic news and/or idiosyncratic news, in terms of
bid-ask spread (BAS), bid size (BSZ), ask size (OSZ), trading size (TSZ), the number of
transactions traded per minute at minute m (NOBSm), time between trades in seconds
(TBT) and return expressed as percentage for second s (RTNS). There is no a priori
expectation on the means of other variables, except for the number of transactions per
minute. The mean of the number of transactions per minute (NOBS) from the AD file
should be significantly larger than that from the NAD file.

3.4.2: Testing the Equality of Variances in Returns
Ross (1989) maintains that the arrival of information has direct impact on the
volatility of stock prices in an arbitrage-free environment. In order to observe the stock
return responses to release news, I employ the Brown-Forsythe-Modified Levene (BFL)
test to examine the volatility differences between days with released news and days
without released news. Levene (1960) proposed a statistical test measuring the equality
of variances with equal sample sizes.

Later, Draper and Hunter (1969) generalized

Levene’s method to apply to samples with unequal observations. However, Brown and
Forsythe (1974) point out that Draper and Hunter’s statistic is not robust if the underlying
populations are skewed. So instead of using the absolute deviations from its group mean
as proposed by Levene (1960), Brown and Forsythe (1974) replace them with the
absolute deviations from its group median.

Conover, Johnson, and Johnson (1981)
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compare more than fifty methods for testing the equality of variances and conclude that
the Brown and Forsythe (1974) modified Levene (1960) (BFL) F-statistic test is among
the most powerful and is, in face, the most robust in departures from normality. This test
has been used to test the equality o f variances of returns in stock market (Lockwood and
Linn 1990) and futures markets (Ederington and Lee 1993, Christie-David and Chaudhry
2000, Aggarwal et al. 2001, Christie-David et al. 2002). For these reasons, I follow this
line of research to examine the equality of variances of returns in the stock market, using
the BFL F-statistic.
First, I examine the overall equality of the variances between the AD file and the
NAD file for each company, using second-by-second stock returns for all trading days in
1994 and 2001, respectively. Thus, the larger the F value (the Overall F value), the more
significant the difference between the variances of returns of Announcement Days and
Nonannouncement Days. If deregulation is indeed effective, then the F values for the
year 1994 are, on the average, smaller than those for the year 2001. Furthermore, not
only do the variances o f returns between Announcement Days and Nonannouncement
Days for the year 2001 show differences, but also the variance of returns of
Announcement Days is greater than the variance of returns of Nonannouncement Days
for the year 2001 for a utility serving the Positive Rank Group states. Conversely, a
company serving the Negative Rank Group states shows no difference between the
variances of returns of Announcement Days and Nonannouncement Days or the variance
o f returns on Announcement Days is less than the variance of returns on
Nonannouncement Days for the year 2001. Moreover, the F values of the companies in
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the Positive Rank Group providing electricity to highly deregulated states are expected to
be higher, on the average, than those from the Negative Rank Group.

Brown-Forsvthe-Modified Levene Test Statistic (BFL)
YdnJ(D l -~ D .^ (N -J )
Test statistic: F«> = —--------------------------J

---------------------------------------------------
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where Fcai follows an F distribution with J-l and N-J degrees of freedom. Reject
Ho if Fcai > F(l-a; J-l, N-J) (Neter et al. 1996).
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= the absolute deviations from its group median

j =1 for the AD file and j - 2 for the NAD file
J = 1,2 ,3,

ns

n\j = the number o f the absolute deviations from its group median in j group
N = ny + tl2
J = 2 indicating there are two groups: the AD group and the NAD group
p
Rsj= In ( ——) ”Second-By-Second” stock return from group j where s = 1, 2,
P5-1
3,....ny. In the instance when more than one transaction occurs at the same
second, Ps-i is the first price traded from previous second.
A
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= the mean absolute deviation from the median for group j.
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3.4.3: Testing the Effects of Macroeconomic News on Returns
Ross (1989) maintains that the arrival of information has direct impact on the
volatility o f stock prices in an arbitrage-free environment. Using the NAD file as a
control, filtering out random effects, the results of BFL test provide insights into the
effectiveness of deregulation. If one of the objectives of deregulation, that is, making the
utility operations more responsive to market forces, is actually met, then the F-values for
utilities in Positive Rank Group should be larger, on the average, than the F-values for
utilities in the Negative Rank Group. However, in order to build robustness into my
findings, I perform regressions on return volatility for each utility, thereby
complementing my comparison between utilities that provide electricity to the Positive
Rank Group states and those that provide electricity to the Negative Rank Group states.
The measure of volatility (osc) is the absolute excess return for a given utility c at second
s. Based on priors and findings in the literature, several independent variables have
impacted the volatility of returns, in addition to macroeconomic news such as
idiosyncratic news, buy-sell indicator, trading volume, bid-ask spread, the sign of return,
and time between trades.

Thus, I regress volatility on a dummy variable for

macroeconomic news, as well as these independent variables too.
Patell and Wolfson (1984) find that it takes only five to ten minutes to adjust
security prices in response to earnings and dividend information. Ederington and Lee
(1993) examine the impact of macroeconomic news announcements on the interest rate
and foreign exchange futures markets and conclude that the majority of the price
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adjustments occur within the first minute of trading after a news announcement and that
high volatility remains for at least fifteen minutes after an announcement and remains
slightly elevated for several hours. Based on the literature, it is reasonable to assume that
the major impact of news, both macroeconomic news and idiosyncratic news, on stock
prices lasts for at most one hour. With this in mind, I set the dummy variable DMAC to
1 for all time periods within sixty minutes from the time of the macroeconomic news
release. Similarly, I set up a dummy variable DIDIO for idiosyncratic news. I assign 1
to DIDIO for all time periods within sixty minutes from the time of the idiosyncratic
news release. It is possible, and very likely, that macroeconomic news and idiosyncratic
news release around the same time; therefore, if DMACRO and DIDIO are both set to be
1, indicating there is an impact to returns from both macroeconomic news and
idiosyncratic news; therefore, I reassign DMACRO and DIDIO to be 0.5. Otherwise,
DMACRO and DIDIO are to be 0. I set DMACRO (DIDIO) at 1 for the period from
9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. if there is macroeconomic news (idiosyncratic news) announced
before trading opens at 9:30 a.m. If there are macroeconomic news and idiosyncratic
news announcements before trading opening on the same day, I set DMACRO and
DIDIO at 0.5 respectively for the period from 9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.
With the characteristics o f market microstructure, many other variables are added
in the regression model to capture the dynamic features of return volatility. Hausman,
Lo, and MacKinlay (1992) suggest that the buy-sell indicator, the volume, the past price
changes, the bid-ask spread, and the time between trades all affect price changes;
therefore, I employ a buy-sell indicator (BSI), a standardized volume measure (VOL), the
interaction of bid-ask spread and return volatility from the previous transaction
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(lag(BASs-i*as)), the interaction o f bid-ask spread, the return volatility, and the sign of
return from the previous transaction (lag(BASs-i*os*Is‘)), and the time between trades
(TBT). The use o f a standardized volume measure (VOL) and a buy-sell indicator are
used as a control for bid-ask bounce. The time between trades (TBT) is a measure of
liquidity to explain some of the return volatility.
Following Blume, MacKinlay, and Terker (1989) and Hausman, Lo, and
MacKinlay (1992), a transaction occurring at time s is buyer-initiated or at the ask if the
trading price for that transaction is greater than the average of the prevailing bid quote
and the prevailing ask quote. A transaction occurring at time s is seller-initiated or at the
bid if the trading price is less than the average of the prevailing bid quote and the
prevailing ask quote. I follow the suggestion of Lee and Ready (1991) and Hausman, Lo,
and MacKinlay (1992) that using the prevailing quotes (ask and bid) occurring at least
five seconds before the current transaction will account for most o f mismatching trade
prices to bid/ask quotes. The buy-sell indicator is set at 1 if the trading price is buyerinitiated, -1 if it is seller-initiated, and 0 if it is equal to the average of the prevailing bidand-ask prices.
Copeland and Galai (1983) maintain that the bid-ask spread and price volatility
are positively related. The interaction of bid-ask spread and return volatility from the
previous transaction (lag(BAS,.i*as)) and the interaction of bid-ask spread, the return
volatility, and the sign of return from the previous transaction (lag(BASs-i*os*Is )) are
designed to reflect the return volatility caused by bid-ask spread. Taking lagged terms
into account for serial dependencies, I* is an indicator variable which is set to be 1 if the
contemporaneous return is negative and 0 otherwise.
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Regression Test for Each Utility
<jx =a0+ a tDMACx + a 2DIDIOx + a }BSIx + ayO Lx

+ aJaglB A S^ * <r,) + a,lag(BAS,.lr * a w* I _ ) + a,TBTlt + e,t (2)

1. c = 1,2,3,4,5,6 where c is an index for identifying each utility.
p
2. Rsc= ln(—S£-)*100 where P5Cis the trading price traded at date d, hour h,
^s-lx
minute m, and second s and P5./.c is the first price traded preceding the current
second.
3. Rc= the average return for a given utility c.
4. a

SC

= Rsc - /? J = the absolute excess return for a given utility c for second s.
1

5. DMACsc — 0.5 where DMACsc =1 for all s < 3600 seconds from time of
0
macroeconomic news release; DMACsc =0.5 if there exists s<3600 seconds
from time o f idiosyncratic news; 0 otherwise.
1
6. DIDIOsc = 0.5 where DIDIOsc =1 for all s < 3600 seconds from time of
0
macroeconomic news release; DIDIOsc =0.5 if there exists s<3600 seconds
from time o f macroeconomic news; 0 otherwise.
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7. BSIsc= Buy-Sell Indicator for the 5th second.

1
BSI =
SC

V K

>

\

i A sK -u +

B id s -ic )

* buyer-initiated

0

IfP x

=

— (Ask^]c + Bid ^Xc)

, indeterminate

-1

IfP sc <

( Asks_]c +Bids_l c)

, seller-initiaed

Where Asks-i.c, ask quote, and Bid5./.c, bid quote, are the first occurrence
quoted at least five seconds before the 5th second.
TSZ
8. VOLsc= ---- — = Standardized trading volume for the 5th second.
TSZC
= the volume of the trade at the sAth second divided by the total volume
for a given utility c.
9. BASs U = ask’- '~ bld'-' *1000
'- ,f (asks_x+ bids_x) / 2
= the first bid-ask spread quoted at least five seconds before the 5th
second.

io. r , =

1
q where T = 1 if the contemporaneous return is negative and 0

otherwise.
11. TBT. = time between trades occurred at second s-1 and second s.
SC

Correction for Autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticitv
When time series data are employed in regression analyses, it is necessary to
determine if there are autocorrelation and/or heteroscedasticity problems.

I use the
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following procedures to detect the existence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity
problems and, when these occur, to correct them.
10. Regress crscon its lag and use the Durbin h-test to detect the presence of firstorder autocorrelation.
11. Once the autocorrelation is identified, I then run a stepwise autoregression
model, using Maximum Likelihood method.

The stepwise autoregression

method initially fits a high-order model with many autoregressive lags and
then sequentially removes those that are not significant. This procedure also
helps in determining the order of autocorrelation.
12. Use Lagrange Multiplier to test heteroscedasticity.
13. Based on the stepwise autoregression model and Lagrange Multiplier results, I
then determine the order of autocorrelation. If a high-order of autocorrelation
exists,

then

GARCH(p,q)

heteroscedasticity;

otherwise,

is

used

to

GARCH(q)

correct
is

autocorrelation

used

to

correct

autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.

GARCH (p. al Regression Model

y,=
x,P
+
u,
”,

(3)

.....

(4)
(5)

(6)
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CHAPTER 4
EM PIRICAL RESULT
4.1: Summary Statistics
For statistical analysis of the seven variables (see Tables 4a and 4b), I use a twosample t-test to measure the market’s movement as it reacts to macroeconomic news and
to idiosyncratic news, both in terms of the seven variables for the years 1994 and 2001:
bid-ask spread (BAS), bid size (BSZ), ask size (SZ), trading size (SZ), the number of
transactions traded per minute at minute m (NOBSm), time between trades in seconds
(TBT), and return expressed as percentage for second s (RTNS).
The analysis provides substantial information. For instance, the BAS in 2001 is
always larger on announcement days than on nonannouncement days for utilities in the
Positive Rank Group. Conversely, the BAS in 2001 for utilities in the Negative Rank
Group is always smaller on announcement days than on nonannouncement days, except
for the Otter Tail Corp. Using DQE, Inc., (deregulated) and Idacorp, Inc., (regulated) as
examples, I find that the ratio for DQE, Inc., is 1.0292, suggesting that the BAS on
announcements days is 2.92% larger, on the average, than the BAS on nonannouncement
days, a statistic that is significant at a 1% level. But the ratio for Idacorp, Inc., is 0.9451,
indicating that the BAS on announcement days is, on the average, 5.49% smaller than the
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BAS on nonannouncement days, where again the difference shows a 1% level of
significance.

The BAS ratios in 2001 indicate that BAS tends to be larger on

announcement days for deregulated utilities and smaller on announcement days for
regulated utilities, with one exception, the Otter Tail Corp. The BAS ratios in 1994 (see
Table 4b) show that there is no difference between the BAS on announcement days and
the BAS on nonannouncement days, with one exception: the BAS of PPL on
announcement days is smaller at a 10% level of significance. Copeland and Galai (1983)
suggest that bid-ask spread and price volatility are positively related; therefore, my
findings may suggest that deregulated utilities are more responsive to the arrival of news
with larger spreads because o f the risk associated with the news releases.
Bid size and offer size exhibit varied findings.

Bid sizes are larger on

announcement days than on nonannouncement days for utilities in the Positive Rank
Group, with the difference being significant at a 1% level of significance. Conversely,
bid sizes are smaller on announcement days than on nonannouncement days for utilities
in the Negative Rank Group, with one exception, Idacorp, Inc. Although the bid size of
Idacorp, Inc., is larger on announcement days, the figures are not significant. However,
offer sizes are consistently larger on announcement days than on nonannouncement days,
with the difference being significant at a 1% level for all utilities in 2001. The bid sizes
and offer sizes in 1994 do not provide any systematic findings.
Like the offer sizes, the number of transactions per minute presents strong and
systematic evidence that there are more transactions occurring on announcements days
than on nonannouncement days for all utilities in 2001 and 1994, with the difference
being significant at a 1% level of significance, except for the Otter Tail Corp. in 2001,
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with no significance, and Central Louisiana Electric Co., Inc., in 1994 with a 10% level
o f significance.

The statistics for trade sizes do not present a systematic pattern.

However, the time between trades on announcement days is smaller than the time
between trades on nonannouncement days for all five utilities, except for the Otter Tail
Corp., because market participants tend to react frequently when there is news released.
No systematic pattern is reflected in the return statistics. I do find that returns tend to be
more positive on nonannouncement days than on announcements days; however, returns
reveal no significant differences between announcement days and nonannouncement days
for utilities in the Negative Rank Group. The summary statistics for 1994 do not offer
new insights regarding the influence of time lapse between trades and the level of returns.
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Table 4a Summary Statistics and Test for Differences in Means between AD and NAD
for 2001
BA Sa o

BSZa o

O SZa d

N O BSA n

tszao

TBTa d

RTNad

M S NAD

BSZn a d

O SZna D

N O BSn a d

T S Z Na d

tbtn ad

ktnnad

Deregulated
DQE
PPL
EE

1.0292” '
1.0029
1.0351” '

1.1132"*
1.0990***
1.1209” *

1.1937'"
1.1380'"
1.0796"'

1.6257’"
1.4999'"
1.4551'"

1.2873
1.1926"*
0.9943

0.8370’"
0.9712"
0.9460

-0.4439"
-0.1724"*
-0.3395

Regulated
IDA
CNL
OTTR

0.9451
0.8787"*
1.1071“ ’

1.0288
0.8257*"
0.8871"*

1.0564
1.0505*"
1.3310'**

1.4135
1.3805'"
1.1599

1.3219
0.8617"*
1.0759

0.9415
0.9394"
1.1675”

8.7000
-0.5426
1.6612

* Significant at the 10% level o f significance
** Significant at the 5% level o f significance
*" Significant at the 1% level o f significance

Table 4b Summary Statistics and Test for Differences in Means between AD and NAD
for 1994
B A Sa d

BSZa d

O SZa d

N O BSa d

TSZa d

TBTa d

RTNad

M S Na d

BSZn a d

O S Z NAD

N O B S Na d

TSZh a d

TBTn a D

BTNhad

DQE
PPL
ELPAQ

0.9993
0.9781'
1.0765

0.7848” ’
1.2871’"
1

0.8960'"
1.2774'"
1

1.7188'"
1.5259'"
1.2170’"

1.0715
1.3111
1.0171

0.9948
1.0767"
1.3205"'

-0.5357
0.1100
-2.2685

IDA
CNL
OTTR

0.9914
1.0022
0.9865

0.8613”
1.0081
1

0.8952"
0.9509
0.9945

1.3974"’
1.1127'
1.2938’"

1.4135”
1.4435"
1.0452

1.0598
1.0078
0.8982

0.2273
-0.5521
-0.8748

* Significant at the 10% level o f significance
*’ Significant at the 5% level o f significance
*** Significant at the 1% level o f significance

Two key statistical inferences may be drawn from Tables 4a and 4b. First, the
summary statistics in Table 4a provide evidence that utilities in the Positive Rank Group
are more responsive to news than utilities in the Negative Rank Groups, as supported by
the BAS statistics in 2001. The BAS statistics in 1994, the year before deregulation,
show that there is no significant difference between the volatility of the BAS on
announcement days and the BAS on nonannouncement days, with only one exception,
the Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. Even though the Pennsylvania Power and Light Co.
exhibits a difference between the volatility of the BAS on announcement days and the
BAS on nonannouncement days at 10% level of significance, it is in a wrong direction
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indicating the volatility o f nonannouncement days is actually greater than the volatility of
announcement days before regulation.

This suggests that utilities are buffered by

regulation and are therefore indifferent to exogenous impact-economic factors. Second,
the number of transactions (NOBS) exhibits a noteworthy pattern:

the number of

transactions per minute presents strong and systematic evidence that there are more
transactions occurring on announcements days than on nonannouncement days for all
utilities in 2001 and 1994. The higher number of transactions across five of the six
utilities on announcement days over nonannouncement days validates the two-step
filtering procedure I use to separate announcement days from nonannouncement days. A
priori, if the two-step filtering procedure is sound, then the number of transactions on
announcement days would be greater than the number of transactions on
nonannouncement days, since market participants are expected to react rapidly and
frequently to the news releases.

Figure 2 illustrates the number of transactions per

minute (NOBS) and the t-value o f the difference between the means of announcement
days and the means of nonannouncement days for utilities in the Positive Rank Group
(deregulated), and Figure 3 shows the same information for utilities in the Negative Rank
Group (regulated).
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□ AD
■ NAD
□t-value

□A D
■NAD
□ t-value

El Paso Electric

90
80 70 60
50
40
30 20
10

□AD
■NAD
□t-value

-

0
2001

Utility Name

Groups belonged

DQE, Inc.

High-Rank Group

PPL Corp.

High-Rank Group

El Paso Electric

High-Rank Group

1994
2001

NOBSaq
27.59
74.94
10.55

NOBSnm, t-value
16.97
49.96
7.25

19.045*"
21.441*"
8.56*"

NOBSad

4.94
9.88
3.27

1994
NOBSnao t-value

2.87
6.47
2.69

13.473*"
13.981*"
3.049*"

NOBSADis the average number of transactions per minute for a given company across all AD days.
N06Snm> is the average number of transactions per minute for a given company across all NAD days.
Significant at the 10% level of significance
**Significant at the 5% level o f significance
™ Significant at the 1% level o f significance

Figure 2: NOBS between ADs and NADs for Deregulated Utilities
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Idacorp Power Inc.

90
80 70 60 50 40 30 20

-

10

-

DAD
■ NAD
□t-value

2001

1994

Cleco C o rp o ra tio n

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20

□ AD
■ NAD
□t-value

10

0
1994

2001

Otter Tail Corp.

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20

□AD
■ NAD
□t-value

10

0
1994

2001
2001
Utility Name

Groups belonged

Idacorp Power Inc Negative-Rank Group
Cleco Corporation Negative-Rank Group
Otter Tail Corp
Negative-Rank Group

N0BSAD

23.92
18.08
5.94

1994

NOBS**, t-value

16.92
13.09
5.12

12.974*“
8.732*“
1.56

NOBSAD

4.02
1.97
1.96

NOBS,*® t-value

2.88
1.77
1.51

8.201*“
1.682*
3.628

NOBS* o is the average number of transactions per minute tor a given company across all AD days.
NOBSwo is the average number of transactions per minute for a given companpcross all NAD days.
' Significant at the 10% level of significance
**Significant at the 5% level of significance
Significant at the 1% level of significance

Figure 3: NOBS between ADs and NADs for Regulated Utilities
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Table 5a: Summary Statistics and Test for Differences in Variance between AD and
NAD for 2001
B ASa o
B A S Na d

b szad
bsz

O SZa d

Na d

o s z NAD

n o b sad

N O B S ffA D

TSZa d

TBTa d

RTNa d

7 5 2 NAD

tbtnad

RTNnad

Deregulated
DQE
PPL
EE

1.9273'”
1.1283'”
1.2808” '

1.3466'”
2.4324'”
1.6065” '

1.5270"'
1.5179’”
1.6038'”

1.8451” '
1.2971”
2.2599” '

21.9803” '
1.5317'"
0.5099'"

0.7310"'
0.8588’"
0.9756

1.3387'”
1.1796'”
2.8540"'

Regulated
IDA
CNL
OTTR

0.8870'”
0.8683"'
1.2272” '

0.0988” '
0.7053” '
0.7328'”

1.2308"'
1.2382"'
2.5984” '

1.0604
1.2906”
0.9851

176.5353"'
1.1049” ’
1.2944"’

0.9026'”
0.7938’”
1.0984"

0.9134'”
0.8772'”
0.9884

’ Significant at the 10% level o f significance
*' Significant at the 5% level o f significance
*" Significant at the 1% level of significance

Table 5b: Summary Statistics and Test for Differences in Variance between AD and
NAD for 1994
BSZa d

O SZad

N O B S AO

NA d

b sznad

O S Z NAD

N O B S Na d

DQE
PPL
ELPAQ

0.6843'"
0.8899"
1.5761

0.7288"'
1.6908'"
N/A

0.4080” '
1.9818"’
N/A

IDA
CNL
OTTR

2.5046'"
1.0003
0.8975

0.7631” ’
0.8856'
N/A

0.8437”
1.2704” ’
N/A

BASa d
b as

TBTa d

RTNa d

Na d

TBTn a d

b t n nad

1.7077” ’
1.6290"’
1.9897'"

0.9239
2.2940’"
0.8918’

0.9371
1.3273’"
1.4878’’’

0.9389
0.9701
1.7678’”

1.9248’’’
1.2201
2.0062” ’

5.7936’"
5.1246” ’
0.8460

1.1017’
0.9539
0.8109'

1.9439'”
0.9480
1.1262

TSZa d
tsz

’ Significant at the 10% level o f significance
" Significant at the 5% level o f significance
Significant at the 1% level o f significance

I also examine variances and the differences in variances between announcement
days and nonannouncement days for 2001 and for 1994 for all seven variables, (see
summary statistics in Tables Sa and Sb.) Similar to the finding presented in Table 4a, all
utilities in the Positive Rank Group exhibit larger BAS variances on announcement days
than on nonannouncement days. This is true for only one utility, Otter Tail Corp in the
Negative Rank Group. Idacorp, Inc., and Cleco Corporation, on the other hand, exhibit
reversed results; that is, the BAS variances on announcement days are smaller than the
BAS variances on nonannouncement days. Bid sizes and returns show contrasting results
between the Positive Rank Group and the Negative Rank Group. The variances of bid
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sizes are significantly larger on announcement days than on nonannouncement days for
utilities in the Positive Rank Group, whereas this finding is reversed for utilities in the
Negative Rank Group: variances of bid sizes are smaller on announcement days than on
nonannouncement days.

Similarly, the variances of returns are significantly larger on

announcement days than on nonannouncement days for utilities in the Positive Rank
Group, a trend that is also reversed for utilities in the Negative Rank Group.

No

significant contrasts are found for the offer sizes, the number of transactions, and the
trading sizes. In the time between trades, there are smaller variances on announcement
days than on nonannouncement days for all utilities except for Otter Tail Corp. This is
consistent with the findings of the differences between the mean values on announcement
days and the mean values on nonannouncement days, and supports the premise that
market participants tend to react frequently to news releases, (see Table 5b for summary
statistics o f variances for all seven variables.) Statistics show that there are no obvious
findings except that, on the average, the differences in variance between announcement
days and nonannouncement days are less significant in 1994 (before deregulation) than
are those in 2001 (after deregulation).

4.2: Results of BFL F Tests
The results o f BFL F test (reported in Table 6) for the year 2001 indicate a strong
contrast in response to news between utilities in the Positive Rank Group and utilities in
the Negative Rank Group. The ratios of the standard deviation for the announcement
days to the standard deviation for the nonannouncement days (S T D ad /S T D n ad ) are all
greater than one for utilities in the Positive Rank Group. This indicates that the return
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variances on announcement days are consistently greater than the return variances on
nonannouncement days for deregulated utilities.

Conversely, S T D ad/S T D nad are

consistently smaller than 1, indicating that the return variances on announcement days are
smaller than the return variances on nonannouncement days for regulated utilities. For
instance, the ratio for DQE, Inc., (a deregulated utility) is 1.16, whereas the ratio for
Idacorp. Inc., (a regulated utility) is 0.96. This provides strong evidence to support my
argument that utilities that are highly deregulated are no longer buffered by regulation
and thus respond to news releases more strongly. Comparing the p-values from the
Positive Rank Group to those from the Negative Rank Group, I find that all variances on
announcement days are significantly larger than variances on nonannouncement days.
For instance, the F-value for DQE, Inc., is 11.1522, and its p-value 0.0008, significant at
1% level of significance. Conversely, the F-value for Idacorp, Inc., is 16.0282 and its pvalue 0.0001, but its variance values indicate that the variance on nonannouncement days
is significantly larger than the variance on announcement days. For Otter Tail Corp,
there is no significant difference between the variance of announcement days and the
variance of nonannouncement days since p-value is 0.5711.
Examining the BFL F test for utilities in 1994, the year before deregulation,
(Table 7), I find that there are no differences in return variance between announcement
days and nonannouncement days for four of the six utilities. For two of the three utilities
that belong to the Positive Rank Group, I find the ratios to be less than 1 and their pvalues are insignificant in 1994, but I find these same two utilities have ratios greater than
1 with a significance level at about 1% level in 2001. This too supports the premise of
increased responses to news releases when utilities move from a regulated environment to
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a deregulated environment. On the other hand, Table 7 shows that all three utilities
belonging to the Negative Rank Group are regressed in response to news releases. For
instance, the S T D Ad /S T D n ad ratio for Idacorp Power, Inc., is greater than 1 and
significant at 10% level o f significance in 1994, whereas the S T D ad /S T D n ad ratio
changes to less than 1 with a 1% level of significance. Similarly, Cleco Corporation
(named Central Louisiana Electric Co., Inc., in 1994) shows a ratio of 0.97 and
insignificant in 1994, whereas its ratio is 0.94 with a significance level at 1% in 2001.
Furthermore, Otter Tail Corp (named Otter Tail Power Corp. in 1994) shows a ratio of
1.06 and insignificant in 1994, whereas its ratio changes to 0.99 and insignificant in 2001.
This shows the responses to news are regressed for all three utilities belonging to the
Negative Rank Group. Taken together, Table 6 and Table 7 suggest that the process of
deregulation has increased the responses to news releases. These findings appear to be
robust, even considering size and capital structure differences. For instance, the PPL
Corporation has the largest assets and debt-to-equity ratio in 2001 but an F-value less
than DQE, Inc’s. Even in 1994, the PPL Corporation (named Pennsylvania Power &
Light Co. in 1994) still has the largest assets and larger debt-to-equity ratio than, for
instance, Idacorp Power, Inc., but the PPL Corporation does not respond to news more
than Idacorp Power, Inc. For example, in 1994, PPL Corporation has the S T D ad /S T D n ad
ratio of 0.98, F-value o f 0.5438, and p-value of 0.4609, but Idacorp Power, Inc., has a
ratio of 1.39, an F-value o f 2.7956, and a p-value o f0.0946.
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Table 6: BFL F Tests for Differences in Return Variance between AD and NAD for 2001

STD a d

Deregulated
DQE, Inc.
PPL Corporation
El Paso Electric
Regulated
Idacorp,Inc.
Cleco Corporation
Otter Tail Corp

F - value

p - value

1.16
1.09
1.69

11.1522
6.6238
3.1454

0.0008
0.0101
0.0762

0.96
0.94
0.99

16.0282
11.0759
0.3210

0.0001
0.0009
0.5711

N ad

N nad

std nad

10696
29267
4088

6575
19511
2801

9318
7033
2131

6590
5093
1705

Table 7: BFL F Tests for Differences in Return Variance between AD and NAD for 1994
Nad

N nad

DQE, Inc.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
El Paso Electric

1883
3814
1117

1011
2482
866

Idacorp Power Inc.
Central Louisiana Electric Co. Inc.
Otter Tail Power Corp.

1489
526
433

944
322
245

std4D

F - value

p - value

0.97
0.98
1.33

0.0508
0.5438
18.1529

0.8216
0.4609
<0.0001

1.39
0.97
1.06

2.7956
0.1986
0.0942

0.0946
0.6560
0.7589

stdNad

J

The BFL F-statistic is:

F™i =

where F„i follows an F distribution with J - l and
”/

J

degrees o f freedom.

___

Y L {D’J-dj)2{J-])
;=

Dv =

i

i= i

is the absolute deviation from its group mean and

return computed over the n, returns in j group.

rsj

■ * - 1=
i 1&V 7)

is the grand mean absolute deviation where
7=1

is the return at second s from group j .

M j

is the sample median

is the mean absolute deviation from the median for group

°sj

is summed over all

nj

seconds o f j groups and

N

j.

is the total

1=1 V

number o f absolute deviations from its group mean o f j groups. J i s l for AD group and 2 for NAD group. Reject H0 if F„i > F(l-a;
J -l, N-J)
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4.3: Results of Regression Tests
Using the NAD file as a control to filter out random effects, I find that the results
of the BFL F test provide evidence that the process of deregulation has increased the
responses to news releases. In order to build robustness into my findings, I perform
regression tests on return volatility. It is not surprising that the results of regression tests
show that utilities in the Positive Rank Group exhibit more pronounced responses to
news releases than the utilities in the Negative Rank Group.
Table 8 shows the results of regression tests for 2001 using Maximum Likelihood
method with 3 lags to correct autocorrelation problems.35 All utilities in the Positive
Rank Group show pronounced responses to macroeconomic news releases at a 1% level
of significance. Idacorp, Inc., and Cleco Corporation in the Negative Rank Group show
mild responses to macroeconomic news at a 10% level of significance, whereas Otter Tail
Corp shows no responses to macroeconomic news. The positive sign of coefficients for
macroeconomic news indicates that macroeconomic news increases return volatility.
Other variables used in the regression tests also exhibit some significant
information. In general, the deregulated utilities respond more often to the standardized
volume measure than the regulated utilities do. And time between trades is significant at
a 1% level of significance across all utilities. The buy-sell indicator is negative and
significant for five o f six utilities. This negative coefficient of the buy-sell indicator
denotes a

bid/ask bounce. For instance, if the previous trades were buyer-initiated

trades, then it is expected that the subsequent trades will be seller-initiated trades, a

13 Heteroscedasticity usually does not occur in time-series data. For precautionary reasons, I use the
procedures described in Chapter 3 to detect and correct autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity for utilities
in 2001. Results o f significances o f independent variables are not much different from results reported in
Table 8 and Table 9.
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transaction shift that will cause price bounces from ask to bid, hence a price change that
becomes negative. Conversely, if the previous trades were seller-initiated trades, then it
is expected that the next trades will be buyer-initiated trades, a transaction which will
cause price bounces from bid to ask, hence a price change that becomes positive.
The interaction of bid-ask spread and return volatility from a previous transaction
(lag (BASs-i*0s)) is significant for all utilities, indicating that market participants take
into account the bid-ask spread as well as the risks. The interaction of bid-ask spread,
return volatility, and the sign of return from a previous transaction (lag (BASs.i*os*Is‘)) is
positive and significant for only three utilities; therefore, it is not clear whether the
negative returns have a larger impact on the return volatility.
In order to check overall improvement in news responses from 1994 to 2001 in
BFL F tests, I conduct regression tests for 1994. The results (Table 9) show a strong
contrast to the results in the 2001 sample. I do not find significant increases in responses
to macroeconomic news from any of the six utilities in 1994, and, overall, I find less
response to other variables as well. This suggests that there is an overall improvement
from 1994 to 2001 in terms of responses to exogenous variables.

In addition, the

responses to macroeconomic news are stronger for utilities serving in highly deregulated
states. This provides empirical evidence that utilities respond more vigorously to market
forces in a deregulated environment.
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Table 8: Regression Tests for Deregulated Utilities and Regulated Utilities in 2001

Constant
Dmacro
Didio
BSI

VOLjdj
Lag(BAS„,*os)
Lag(BASn*o,*I)
TBT
Total R2

Deregulated Utilities
DQE
0.000557***
0.000154***
0.000980**’
-0.000087*’*
0.00000096992**
-0.004844***
0.002203
0.00000065061***
0.0511

PPL
0.000181*”
0.0000549***
-0.000129
-0.000029*’*
0.0000170***
-0.0147***
0.0107***
0.0000012904*
0.0602

EE
0.000994***
0.000436*’*
- 0.000210
-0.000146***
0.0000203***
-0.000799**
0 . 0102**’
0.00000026194*
0.2362

Regulated Utilities
IDA
0.000403***
0.0000417*
0.000673**
-0.000057***
0.00000030199
0.009165***
-0.002272
0.00000052657***
0.0608

CNL

OTTR

0.000575***
0.0000798*
-0.000064
-0.000071***
0.0000480***
0.002228*
0.002956
0.00000065487***

0.002504***
0.000294
0.000457
-0.000045
0.0000631
0.006082***
0.003229***
0.0000016596*
0.1185

0.1

* Significant at the 10% level o f significance
** Significant at the 5% level o f significance
*** Significant at the 1% level o f significance

Table 9: Regression Tests for Regulated Utilities in 1994
Constant
Dmacro
Didio
BSI
VOL*jj
Ug(BASf.,*o,)
Lag(BAS1.1*a,*I)
TBT
Total R2

DQE
0.001394***
0.000133
-0.000847
0.0000421
0.0000211**
0.005535*
0.003345
0.00000029411***
0.0364

PPL
0.002050***
-0.000063
-0.000362
-0.000117***
0.0000139***
0.000458
0.002514
0.000000023047
0.0410

* Significant at the 10% level o f significance
** Significant at the 5% level o f significance
*** Significant at the 1% level o f significance

ELPAQ
0.009514***
0.003167
-0.000764
0.002684***
-0.000473
0.006484***
-0.002750***
0.000002193
0.1238

IDA
0.001003***
-0.000082
-0.000684^
-0.000188***
0.0000590
0.0220
##*
0.0759
0.00000025338***
0.2362

CNL
0.002345***
-0.000019
-0.000453
0.000401***
0.0000140
0.006075
0.0105**
0.00000013702**
0.0602

OTTR
0.006601
0.001481
N/A
0.000242
-0.000639**
0.007343**
0.001173
0.00000023972
0.0659

CHAPTERS
CONCLUSION
The deregulation o f the electric utility is designed to reduce government
intervention, to let the interaction of supply and demand determine wholesale power
price, and to encourage competition in retail markets so that customers may choose their
power suppliers, based on options of low rates or high-quality services. With this in
mind, I examine one particular purpose of deregulation in the electric utility industrymaking utility operations more responsive to market force. My premise is that utilities
that provide electricity to highly deregulated states will be more responsive to market
forces than those providing electricity to regulated states. To investigate this issue, I use
the following sampling procedures: First, to identify two categories o f utilities, I identify
states that are moving toward to customer-choice model and states that specifically reject
the customer-choice method o f deregulation. The Retail Energy Deregulation (RED)
Index, 2nd edition, July 2001, from the Center for the Advancement of Energy Markets
provides a sound basis to categorize these states, using 22 attributes. Second, I sample
two extreme groups from their ranking distribution: the Positive Rank Group states and
the Negative Rank Group states.

Third, for each category, I find three utilities serving

predominantly highly deregulated states and three utilities serving regulated states.
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To measure the success of the deregulation process of each state, I examine
utilities’ responses to market forces, comparing utilities providing electricity to highly
deregulated states with those providing electricity to regulated states in 2001. In order to
develop a more accurate and robust base of reference, I also examine the responses of the
specified utilities to market forces for the year 1994 (the year preceding deregulation).
Next, I identify twenty-two o f the most important microeconomic news releases by
governmental and private agencies as a proxy of market forces for 2001 and 1994. To
measure the instantaneous responses of stock prices to these news releases, I then secure
intraday trade and quote data from the New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quote
database for the sample period of April to June of 2001 and April to June of 1994. I use a
two-step filtering procedure to separate trade and quote data into two files: the
announcement days file (AD file) and the nonannouncement days file (NAD file). The
AD file for each utility contains the following data: the bid-ask spread (BAS), the bid size
(BSZ), the offer size (OSZ), the trade size (TSZ), the number of transactions traded at
minute m (NOBSm), and the time lapse between trades in seconds (TBT) on days that
have at least one news release (macroeconomic news and/or idiosyncratic news), whereas
the NAD file for each utility contains the same set of data but on days that have no news
releases. The NAD file is used as a control to filter random effects.
After the trade and quote data are separated into Announcement Days file and
Nonannouncement Days file, I conduct a t-test and identify two key statistical inferences
from the summary statistics. First, the summary statistics of the BAS provide evidence
that utilities in the Positive Rank Group are more responsive to news releases than
utilities in the Negative Rank Groups for the year 2001. The BAS statistics in 1994, the
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year before deregulation, show that there is no significant difference between the
volatility of the BAS on announcement days and the BAS on nonannouncement days,
with only one exception, the Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. This suggests that utilities
are buffered by regulation and are therefore indifferent to exogenous impactmacroeconomic factors.

Second, the number of transactions (NOBS) exhibits a

significant pattern: the number of transactions per minute presents strong and systematic
evidence that more transactions occur on announcements days than on nonannouncement
days for all utilities in both 2001 and 1994.
Ross (1989) maintains that the arrival of information has a direct impact on the
volatility of stock prices in an arbitrage-free environment. For my study, I investigate the
stock return responses to release news, using the Brown-Forsythe-Modified Levene
(BFL) test to examine the volatility differences between days with released news and
days without released news. The results of BFL F test (reported in Table 6) for the year
2001 indicate a strong contrast in response to news between utilities in the Positive Rank
Group and utilities in the Negative Rank Group. The ratios of the standard deviation for
the announcement days to the standard deviation for the nonannouncement days
(S T D ad /S T D nad)

are all greater than 1 for utilities in the Positive Rank Group. This

indicates that the return variances on announcement days are consistently greater than the
return variances on nonannouncement days for deregulated utilities. Conversely, the
ratios of S T D ad/S T D nad are consistently smaller than 1, indicating that the return
variances on announcement days are smaller than the return variances on
nonannouncement days for regulated utilities. This provides strong evidence to support
my argument that utilities that are highly deregulated are no longer buffered by regulation
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and thus respond more strongly to news releases. Examining the BFL F test for utilities
in 1994, the year before deregulation, (Table 7), I find no differences in return variance
between announcement days and nonannouncement days for four of the six utilities. For
two of the three utilities that belong to the Positive Rank Group, I find the ratios to be
less than 1 and their p-values insignificant in 1994, but I find that these same two utilities
have ratios greater than 1 with a significance level at about 1% level in 2001. These
findings also support the premise of increased responses to news releases when utilities
move from a regulated environment to a deregulated environment. My findings appear to
be robust, even considering size and capital structure differences. For example, the PPL
Corporation has the largest assets and debt-to-equity ratio in 2001, but an F-value less
than DQE, Inc’s. Even in 1994, the PPL Corporation (named Pennsylvania Power &
Light Co. in 1994) still shows larger assets and larger debt-to-equity ratio than, for
instance, Idacorp Power, Inc., but the PPL Corporation does not respond to news more
strongly than Idacorp Power, Inc.
My last test, a regression test, examines the effects of macroeconomic news;
idiosyncratic news; standardized volumes; a buy-sell indicator; the interaction between
bid-ask spread and return volatility from a previous transaction (lag (BASs-i*os)); the
interaction between bid-ask spread, return volatility, and the sign of return from a
previous transaction (lag (BASs.i*cs*Is')); and time lapse between trade on return
volatility. The results o f the regression test support the findings from BFL tests that all
utilities in the Positive Rank Group show pronounced responses to macroeconomic news
releases at a 1% level o f significance, whereas fewer responses are shown in the Negative
Rank Group for the year 2001. Furthermore, the regression tests of 1994 give evidence
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even more striking—findings show that none of the utilities respond to macroeconomic
news releases. Given the strong and significant responses from the utilities in the High
Rank Group and fewer responses from the utilities in the Negative Rank Group for the
year 2001, the findings for the year 1994 reconfirm my conjecture that deregulation in the
electric utility industry does, in fact, make utility operations more responsive to market
forces and that deregulation is indeed effective for states that implement a customerchoice model.

Both BFL F tests and regression tests provide substantial empirical

evidence that utilities respond more vigorously to market forces in a deregulated
environment and that deregulation is indeed effective in states that implement a
customer-choice model.
The contributions o f this study to the power industry may be identified as follows:
(1) the success o f deregulation depends largely on each state’s restructuring plan;
therefore, this study provides state and federal legislatures with empirical evidence of the
effectiveness of deregulation; (2) the findings of this study will influence the way state
and federal legislatures enact utility laws; (3) this study provides empirical evidence of
successful deregulation models; therefore, a further study of the restructuring policies of
successful deregulation models could be done to improve the competition of the electric
utility industry in all states; (4) this study provides methods that may be applied to other
deregulated industries.
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RED INDEX SCORES AND ATTRIBUTE LISTING
Exhibit 3-1: RED Index Scores in July 200136
Sea. No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

States
Pennsylvania
Texas
New York
Maine
DC
Maryland
New Jersey
Arizona
Virginia
Illinois
Montana
Connecticut
Michigan
Massachusetts
Ohio
Rhode Island
California
Delaware
New Hampshire
Oregon
West Virginia
Arkansas
Nevada
New Mexico

Rank

Score

1
2
3
4
5
5
7
7
9
9
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
21
23
24

66
65
64
62
56
56
47
47
45
45
44
43
42
41
39
36
34
31
27
24
17
17
12
9

“ Source is from Retail Energy Deregulation (RED) Index, 2nd edition, July 2001, pp. 136-138, Center for
the Advancement o f Energy Markets. A score of 0 indicates that a state is still implementing the
traditional monopolistic model; a score of 100 indicates that a state is completely and effectively
implementing the customer choice model, whereas a negative score indicates that a state explicitly rejects
the policies of restructuring in the retail energy market.
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Sea. No. States
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Vermont
Kentucky
Washington
Alaska
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Missouri
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Nebraska
Colorado
Idaho
Alabama
Louisiana
Minnesota
Mississippi

Rank

Score

25
26
27
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
51
51
51
51
51
51
51

6
3
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-8
-8
-8
-8
-8
-8
-8
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Exhibit 3-2: Attribute Listing37
A.

Competitive Framework Cluster
1. Does a detailed plan exist?
2. What percentage of customers are eligible?
3. What percentage o f customers have switched?
4. What safeguards prevent utility/affiliate favoritism?
5. How standardized are business practices?
6. Is billing a competitive service?
7. Is metering a competitive service?

B.

Generation Cluster
8. What is the market structure for generation?
9. How controlled is the wholesale market?
10. Do stranded costs meet a market test?
11. Are stranded cost charges fixed?

C.

Consumer Cluster
12. Are suppliers granted effective access to customer information?
13. Is a comprehensive consumer education program required?
14. How are default customers handled?

D.

Distribution Cluster
15. Do default prices allow effective competition from suppliers?
16. Are default rates properly set?
17. Is performance-based pricing used for network facilities?
18. Are efficient pricing principles used for network pricing?
19. Do policies impede small-scale generation?

E.

Commission Cluster
20. Are gas and electric policies integrated?
21. Has the commission reengineered its processes for new regime?
22. Is commission budget commensurate with new responsibilities?

37 Source is from Retail Energy Deregulation (RED) Index, 2nd edition, July 2001, pp. 5-6,41-71, Center
for the Advancement o f Energy Markets.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

REFERENCES
Aggarwal, R., Chaudhry, M., Christie-David, R., Koch, T. W., “The Responses of
Interest Rate Spreads to Information Releases,” Review of Quantitative Finance and
Accounting, Vol. 16, (2001), pp. 345-368.
Archer, Stephen H., “The Regulatory Effects on Cost of Capital in Electric Utilities,”
Public Utilities Fortnightly, Vol. 107, No. 5 (February 1981), pp. 36-39.
Blacconiere, Walter G., Johnson, Marilyn F., and Johnson, Mark S., “Market Valuation
and Deregulation of Electric Utilities,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 29,
No. 2 (2000), pp. 231-160
Blume, M., MacKinlay, C., and Terker, B., “Order Imbalances and Stock Price
Movements on October 19 and 20,1987,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 44, No. 4 (September
1989), pp. 827-848.
Brennan, Michael J., and Schwartz, Eduardo S., “Consistent regulatory policy under
uncertainty,” Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13 (Autumn 1982), pp. 506-521.
Brown, Morton B., and Forsythe, Alan B., “Robust Tests for the Equality o f Variances,”
Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 69, No. 346 (June 1974), pp. 364367.
Chandrasekaran, P. R. and Dukes, William P., “Risk Variables Affecting Rate of Return
of Public Utilities,” Public Utilities Fortnightly, Vol. 26, (February 1981), pp. 32-35.
Christie-David, Rohan, and Chaudhry, Mukesh, “Currency Futures, News Releases, and
Uncertainty Resolution,” Global Finance Journal, Vol. 11, (2000), pp. 109-127.
Christie-David, Rohan, Chaudhry, Mukesh, and Khan, Walayet, “News Releasees,
Market Integration, and Market Leadership,” Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 25, No.
2 (Summer 2002), pp. 223-245.
Clarke, Rodger G., “The Effect of Fuel Adjustment Clauses on the Systematic Risk and
Market Values of Electric Utilities,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 35, No. 2 (May 1980), pp.
347-358.
Copeland, Thomas E. and Galai, Dan, “Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread,”
Journal of Finance, Vol. 38, No. 5 (December 1983), pp. 1457-1469.

87
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88

Conover, W., Johnson, M., and Johnson, M., “A comparative study of tests for
homogeneity of variances, with applications to the outer continental shelf bidding data,”
Technometrics, Vol. 23 (1981), pp. 351-361.
Draper, N. R., and Hunter, W. G., ‘Transformations: Some Examples Revisited,”
Technometrics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1969), pp. 23-40.
Ederington, Louis H., and Lee, Jae H., “How Markets Process Information: News
Releases and Volatility,” Journal o f Finance, Vol. 48, No. 4 (September 1993), pp. 11611191.
Fama, E., “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review o f Theory and Empirical Work,” Journal
of Finance, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1970), pp. 383-417.
Flannery, Mark J., and Protopapadakis, Aris A., “Macroeconomic Factors Do Influence
Aggregate Stock Returns,” The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer
2002), pp. 751-782.
Hausman, J., Lo, A., and MacKinlay, C., “An Ordered Probit Analysis of Transaction
Stock Prices,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 31 (1992), pp. 319-379.
Jackson, R., “Regulation and Electric Utility Rate Levels,” Land Economics, Vol. 45, No.
3 (August 1969), pp. 372-376.
Joskow, Paul L., and MacAvoy, Paul W., “Regulation and the Financial Condition of
Power Companies in the 1970’s,” American Economic Review, Vol. 65, No. 2 (May
1975), pp. 295-301.
Jain, P. G., “The Response of Hourly Stock Prices and Trading Volume to Economic
News,” Journal of Business, Vol. 61 (1988), pp. 219-231.
Jordan, William A., “Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of
Government Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 15, No. 1 (April 1972),
pp. 151-176.
Joskow, Paul L., “Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process
of Public Utility Price Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2
(October 1974), pp. 291-327.
Lee, Charles M. C., and Ready, Mark J., “Inferring Trade Direction from Intraday Data,”
Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 733-746.
Levene, H., “Robust Tests for Equality of Variances,” in I. Olkin, ed., Contributions to
Probability and Statistics, Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1960, 278292.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89

Lockwood, L., and Linn, S., “An examination of stock market return volatility during
overnight and intraday periods, 1964-1989,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1990),
pp. 591-601.
MacAvoy, Paul W., “The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas,” Journal of Law
and Economics, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1971), pp. 167-199.
Meyer, Robert A., and Leland, Hayne E., ‘The Effectiveness of Price Regulation,”
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 62 (1980), pp. 555-566.
Moore, T. G., “The Effectiveness of Regulation of Electric Utility Prices,” Southern
Economic Journal, Vol. 36, No. 4 (April 1970), pp. 365-375.
Norton, Seth W., “Regulation and Systematic Risk: The Case of Electric Utilities,”
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1985), pp. 671-686.
Norton, Seth W., “Regulation, the OPEC Oil Supply Shock, and Wealth Effects for
Electric Utilities,” Economic Inquiry, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1988), pp. 223-238.
Nwaeze, Emeka T., “Deregulation and the Market Valuation of Earnings and Assets for
Electric Utilities,” Advances in Financial Planning and Forecasting,” Vol. 9, No. 1
(1999), pp. 67-90.
Patell, J., and Wolfson, M., “The Intraday Speed of Adjustment of Stock Prices to
Earnings and Dividend Announcements,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 13
(1984), pp. 223-252.
Peltzman, Sam, "Pricing in Public and Private Enterprises: Electric Utilities in the United
States," The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1971), pp. 109-147.
Peltzman, Sam, “An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug
Amendments,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 81, No. 5 (September-October 1973),
pp. 1049-1091.
Peltzman, Sam, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," The Journal of Law and
Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2 (August 1976), pp. 211-240.
Posner, Richard A., “Theories of economic regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Autumn 1974), pp. 335-358.
Posner, Richard A, “The appropriate scope of regulation in the cable television industry,”
Bell Journal o f Economics and Management Science, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1972), pp.
98-129.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

90

Ross, Stephen A., “Information and Volatility: The No-Arbitrage Martingale Approach to
Timing and Resolution Irrelevancy,” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 44, No. 1 (March
1989), pp. 1-17.
Spann, Robert, “The Regulatory Cobweb: Inflation, Deflation, Regulatory Lag and the
Effects of Alternative Administrative Rules in Public Utilities,” Southern Economic
Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1 (July 1976), pp. 827-839.
Stigler, George J., and Friedland, Claire, “What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of
Electricity,” The Journal o f Law and Economics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (October 1962), pp. 1-16.
Stigler, George. J., 1971, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1971), pp. 3-21
Upadhyaya, Kamal P., Raymond, Jeannie E., and Mixon, Franklin G. Jr., “The Economic
Theory of Regulation versus Alternative Theories for the Electric Utilities Industry: A
Simultaneous Probit Model,” Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 19, No. 3, (June
1997), pp. 193-204.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

